An analysis of the amalgamation of the CS and SD ratings in the United States Navy by Weittenhiller, Larry K. & White, Craig C. L.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMALGAMATION OF
THE CS AND SD RATINGS IN






AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMALGAMATION OF THE CS AND SD




Craig C. L. White
June 1978
Thesis Advisor: R. L. Forbes




SECURITY CLASSinCATION OF THIS FAGC (Wfyan Datm BnfftI)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I REPORT NUMSCR 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO, 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtltim)
An Analysis of the Amalgamation of the
CS and SD Ratings in the United States
Navy
». TYRE OF REPORT * PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis:
June 1978
S. PCRPORMINC ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AuTmORC»>
Larry K. Weittenhiller
Craig C. L. White
• . CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERC*;
S. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
IT MONITORING AGENCY NAME * AOORESSC// dlllurm%t /ram Controltint Ottlet)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol Ihf riport)
Unclassified
<Sa. OECLASSIFl cation/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thit Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tl%» tbatrmet tttmnd In Bloek 30, II dlllttnt Iromt Kaport)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continu* on rovfo aldo II noeooaary "td tdantlty by block numbar)
Amalgamation of Commissaryman and Steward ratings into the Mess
Management Specialist rating
History of food in naval operations
Role of food in modern naval environment
Human Resource Management survey fcontinued on next pagel
20. ABSTRACT (Conllnua an ravaraa alda II naeaaaarr anrf Idantltr by kieeJr numbar)
This study examines the impact of the amalgamation of the
Navy's former Commissaryman (CS) and Steward (SD) ratings into
the Mess Management Specialist (MS) rating. Vehicles used to
analyze the impact of the amalgamation include the responses of
6,594 CS, SD and MS personnel to the Navy's Human Resource Man-
agement (HRM) survey during the three-year period, 1974-76, and




DD 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV SS IS OBSCLCTC
S/N 0103-014* 6601 |
1
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Daia Mnlarad)

UNCLASSIFIED
£^ t u i*! T V Classification o^ tmis p>GEi''»^»n nnm gwf>«j
area in early 1978. The amalgamation is also briefly analyzed
using the Leavitt socio- technical model o£ organizational change
Included in the study is a historical view of the role food has
played in naval operations and the role of food and food service
support systems in the modern naval environment. Having examine^
the amalgamation from these perspectives, major conclusions are
found to include: (1) food service support systems impact heavily
on morale, quality of work life, satisfaction, retention and
indirectly on mission accomplishment, (2) a true amalgamation of
attitudes and perceptions by Filipino and Caucasian MS personnel
has not occurred, (3) the HRM survey may be a potentially useful
tool to assess and monitor organizational change, (4) MS per-
sonnel have a poor self-image, (5) both Filipino and Caucasian
racial sub-groups are still experiencing organizational frustra-
tion, intercultural conflict and uncertainty as a result of the
amalgamation. Recommendations for future direction were divided
into rating-specific and Navy-specific categories.
19. Key Words (continued)
Socio- technical model of organization change
Filipino, Black and Caucasian racial sub-groups in the MS rating




1 Jan . 3
5/N 0102-014-6601 o $rrui»iTy cuA$firiCATiON of this ^*atrwh.r, d.»- ffnf.-^)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
An Analysis o£ the Amalgamation of the CS and SD
Ratings in the United States Navy
by
Larry K. Weittenhiller
Lieutenant Commandi^r, United States Navy
B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1965
M.A. , Webster College, 1976
and
Craig C. L. White
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1967
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This study examines the impact of the amalgamation of the
Navy's former Commissaryman (CS) and Steward (SD) ratings into
the Mess Management Specialist (MS) rating. Vehicles used to
analyze the impact of the amalgamation include the responses
of 6,594 CS, SD and MS personnel to the Navy's Human Resource
Management (HRM) survey during the three-year period, 1974-76,
and interview data gathered from 60 MS personnel from the San
Diego area in early 1978. The amalgamation is also briefly
analyzed using the Leavitt socio- technical model of organiza-
tional change. Included in the study is a historical view of
the role food has played in naval operations and the role of
food and food service support systems in the modern naval
environment. Having examined the amalgamation from these
perspectives, major conclusions are found to include: (1)
food service support systems impact heavily on morale, quality
of work life, satisfaction, retention and indirectly on mission
accomplishment, (2) a true amalgamation of attitudes and per-
ceptions by Filipino and Caucasian MS personnel has not oc-
curred, (3) the HRM survey may be a potentially useful tool
to assess and monitor organizational change, (4) MS personnel
have a poor self-image, (5) both Filipino and Caucasian racial
sub-groups are still experiencing organizational frustration,
intercultural conflict and uncertainty as a result of the
amalgamation. Recommendations for future direction were
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most disagreeable thing at sea is the cookery; for
there is not, properly speaking, any professional cook
on board. The worst sailor is generally chosen for that
purpose. Hence comes the proverb used among the English
sailors, that "God sends meat, and the Devil sends cooks."
(Benjamin Franklin, 17??)
There is little argument that significant advances and
improvements have taken place in food service operations
aboard ships since the days of Benjamin Franklin. So good,
in fact, is the food service support system aboard most U.S.
Navy ships that it becomes increasingly easier to overlook the
importance of the Navy's Mess Management Specialists (MS's)
who are involved each day in preparing food to satisfy this
basic human need. In the past, the method most often used to
judge the level of satisfaction and organizational health of
these key individuals involved in food service has been by
the perceived quality of their product. This largely sub-
jective approach ignored more subtle indications that a serious
organizational problem was brewing in this important rating.
A problem which has the potential to adversely impact on the
lives of every naval member, especially those serving for long
periods at sea.
Information representative of the magnitude of the MS
problem is contained in recent Bureau of Naval Personnel man-
ning figures. While the MS rating is still the third largest
in the Navy (N=16,286) and has a present manning level of
96.4%, the recent negative personnel trends in the rating are
10

cause for great concern. Since the creation of the MS rating
on 1 January 1975, there has been a growing deficit between
the number of MS personnel needed annually to sustain a viable
career force and the number retained. This deficit has grown
from approximately 200 in FY 75 to over 800 in FY 77. During
this same period, the first term reenlistment rate for eligi-
ble MS ' s has plummeted from 89% to only 401 while the number
of ineligibles has been steadily increasing both by head
count and as a percentage of total personnel coming to the
end of their enlistment. The total number of ineligible
personnel in FY 77 was 775, or about 45% of those completing
enlistment. Current projections show no significant improve-
ments in these trends.
What are some of the implications of the trends just
mentioned? First, the MS rating is beginning to feel a real
shortage of personnel at the bottom of the rating structure.
This projection will result in a serious shortfall in the
near future at the E-4 and E-5 petty officer level.
Second, the MS rating's current overall manning level is
due in large part to the carry-over of personnel from the old
Steward (SD) rating. The Stewards were combined with the
former Commissaryman (CS) rating in 1975 to form the new MS
rating. Over half of the overage that currently exists in
the upper enlisted MS paygrades will disappear in the next
two to four years as these people reach 20 years of service.
Third, the accession picture, including "on the job"
(OJT) inputs from the fleet, is going to be far short of the
3,300 needed annually. This will likely occur unless the
11

thruput of the Navy's MS Class "A" school is significantly-
increased from its present level of 2,200. This predicted
accession shortfall, coupled with the all-volunteer force
concept and the projected decline in the number of service
age males over the next few years, means the MS rating will
be competing more intensely for human resources in a shrink-
ing supply market.
With a paucity of inputs at the bottom of the MS rating,
the Navy will face a serious shortage of qualified food service
junior petty officers in the next three to four years. This
lack of people will be further aggravated by a reduction in
the present career force due to retirements. Taken together,
these factors imply the MS rating will soon be severely under-
manned.
This study attempts to look beyond the cold, hard figures
toward a more global analysis of the Navy • s food service sup-
port system. This analysis will include a discussion of the
problems associated with the merger of the former SD and CS
ratings. The second chapter begins with a brief historical
description of food service operations and their impact on
naval operations. The third chapter is concerned with a
literature search regarding the role food has played in the
naval warfare environment.
Following a short chapter describing the methodology used
in this study is Chapter V which focuses on the impact of the
amalgamation of former SD and CS personnel into the MS rating.
The principal research method employs investigation of the
12

Human Resource Management (HRM) survey data bank and formal
interviews with fleet MS personnel. These two data-gathering
vehicles are used as the primary basis for the analysis of
pertinent issues related to the perceptual and socio-cultural
factors existing within the MS rating.
A second analytic perspective that will be utilized in-
volves the use of a socio-technical model of organizational
change. The principal intent of this analytic process is
to attempt to provide additional clues concerning existing
problems within the MS rating. An additional goal of the
study is to offer problem solutions or alternatives arising
out of the data analysis.
MS personnel are an extremely important human resource
within the Navy. The viability and survival of the rating
in its present form is necessary to preclude a decrease in
both the combat-readiness of fleet personnel and their health
and morale while serving aboard naval commands. The present
situation within the MS rating is a "sleeper" and only by
prompt concerted action will the Navy be able to ensure that
its members are properly fed by a professional, well- trained
and highly motivated group of individuals.
In light of the increasing emphasis on retention within
the naval organization, the Navy cannot afford to overlook
the significance of the food service support system. This
system appears to have an important role in influencing naval
members regarding continued service in the organization.
13

This study may be considered as unique both in the breadth
of material covered and the use of the HRM survey data bank to
analyze the perceptions and attitudes of MS personnel. The
HRiM survey data has been used earlier by the Naval Personnel
Research and Development Center (1977) in a preliminary report
to the Chief of Naval Personnel on racial attitudes. However,
the report attempted to make trend comparisons between the
entire Filipino and Caucasian populations within the Navy.
No study has thus far been done exclusively on responses to
the HRM survey from just the MS community.
Another recent study concerning Filipinos in the Navy
(Szalay and Bryson, 1977) took a small sample of Caucasians
and Filipinos (C=150, F=267) and did an in-depth assessment
of psycho-cultural dispositions. Szalay and Bryson' s method
involved using spontaneous word association techniques and a
questionnaire focused on service satisfaction, communication
problems and interpersonal relations.
Two earlier informal sensing attempts were also conducted
among MS personnel. (CINCLANTFLT, 1977; Nartea, 1977). One
was conducted aboard a large east coast ship involving 63
former CS and SD personnel and the other in the Norfolk area
involving 27 former SD personnel. The results of both studies
highlighted significant dissatisfaction within the Filipino
community with regard to the CS and SD merger.
The authors' intent in doing this study is to stimulate
further interest and research into the Navy's food service
support system. This research will focus special emphasis
14

on the personnel who provide the human resources needed to
make the system function efficiently and effectively. The
study is meant to be an initial effort toward identifying
issues, problems and concerns that require command attention
to improve the attractiveness of the MS rating and to in-
crease the pride and sense of satisfaction of those presently
serving in the rating.
15

II. HISTORICAL ROLE OF FOOD IN NAVAL OPERATIONS
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF FOOD
In this age of atomic energy, electronic gadgetry and
sophisticated technologies, we tend to take for granted the
substantiation for the need for food. We as a society are
just beginning to see the impact of food on morale and human
performance. Intuitively, military commanders agree that
Napoleon's observation that "an army marches on its stomach"
is valid. The critical attention-getter in today's Navy is
fleet readiness, as it has been traditionally. Many man-hours
and dollars are expended yearly ensuring that inanimate equip-
ments have necessary fuel and spare parts in sufficient quan-
tity and repair to ensure mission accomplishment. Can we
afford to neglect human fuel and its management? A knowledge
of where one's job fits into the scheme of things helps to




1 . Phoenician Traders
Phoenician traders filled their round bottom boats
with trade goods and provisions and mastered the Mediterranean
Sea and the eastern Atlantic along the western coast of Europe
by 1000 B.C. They carried dried grains and other foods in
limited quantities, putting in to port or shore frequently
to replenish. The Greek historian Herodotus credits the
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Phoenicians with a circumnavigation of Africa that took three
years to complete. [Miegs, 1924]. Provisions for this feat
were accumulated by making harbor, sowing corn, and waiting
until it was harvested before moving on. This may seen to
have been a simple solution, but no other circumnavigation
of Africa is recorded until Vasco De Gama's voyages in the
15th century.
2 . Greek and Roman Military History
Early naval tactics were little more than water-borne
infantry tactics. The Greeks and Romans also put in to shore
frequently to prepare food and reprovision. Little room was
allowed for provisions and most of what was carried was
brought aboard by individuals. Thus, the fighting of early
navies was limited as much by the ability to feed a crew as
by navigational techniques.
Like the Phoenicians, the Vikings had a natural
affinity for the sea. Their explorations ranged from Pal-
estine in the East to what is now America in the West. Given
the ranges of these explorations and the limited storage
capacities of their vessels, the Vikings must have been able
to master the problem of provisioning. Island-hopping and
being able to both row and sail reduced the storage require-
ments but did not solve the problem. It is known that salted
meat and fish were stocked as well as live cattle. In addi-
tion to hunting game on land, the Vikings hunted seals at sea
during the voyages. Food was prepared in bronze kettles
heated over fires made in ovens on the open decks.
17

During the Crusades, the typical provisioning periods
ranged from one month to a year. As with the rest of the
Middle Ages, exploration by Europeans was pretty well limited
to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic coast. By the end
of the 15th century exploration again became a motivating
force in the coastal countries of Europe. Methods of pro-
visioning had changed little from the 12th century when the
Venetians had been at the cutting edge of seamanship in the
Mediterranean Sea. Continuing an early nautical practice,
each crewman or passenger was expected to provide his own




When Columbus sailed for the New World in 1492, his
ships were provisioned for a one-year voyage with bacon,
beans, salt fish, cheese, bread, water, and wine. These
foodstuffs deteriorated rapidly in the hot, damp holds.
Nonetheless, they were sufficient to sustain the explorers
on their seventy-day voyage.
One hundred years before the Columbian expeditions,
the Chinese were constructing large sailing ships accommo-
dating six hundred seamen and four hundred soldiers. Seamen
were allowed servants and family accommodations on board.
Some of the food and nutritional problems were solved by
planting and growing herbs and vegetables in small plots on
board ship. [Meigs, 1924].
4 English Navy
With the reign of Henry VIII in England came the gen-
esis of what ultimately evolved into the United States Navy.
18

The GREAT HARRY, one of England's first large (1500 ton) war-
ships, carried a crew of seven hundred which included three
stewards, three cooks, plus three cooks' mates, to procure
and prepare the food. Henry's Navy was the first English
navy to stockpile stores and provisions in ports to issue to
his ships. The Elizabethan Navy further refined the art of
going to sea. The crews were divided into groups of five or
six for messing with stewards delivering the food from the
cook's pots to the individual messes. In addition to pre-
paring the food, the cooks had charge of the store of platters,
spoons, etc. This was in contrast to the Spanish custom of
the same period of individual preparation of food.
How did these methods effect the operations of the
Navy? The largely putrid condition of shipboard food still
persisted as in Columbus's day. The result of the food
deterioration and spoilage was a high incidence of death and
disease which severely limited the ability of a ship to fight
after but a few days at sea. Beer rations were standard but
even though it often amounted to a gallon a day, it was in-
sufficient to dull the effects of poor food. In reality,
beer added to the food-induced illness level when it soured.
In addition to the bad quality of rations, the custom of pro-
viding short weights in an effort to make extra money off of
the provisioning contracts started on a large scale during
this period. Unfortunately, these conditions became almost
a tradition for nearly two hundred years. In order to
attract better qualified and healthier seamen, wages were
19

raised by Sir John Hawkins. This action had as a primary
goal an increase in the tactical capabilities of ships of
the Royal Navy. It also provided more room for stores by
reducing the number of sick men who took up needed space
and were contributing nothing to operational performance.
In light of the physical deterioration of the crews, it is
amazing that the Spanish Armada was driven from the English
Channel by the ships of Sir Frances Drake. Of course, it
must be noted that the Spanish crews were in not much better
physical condition as a direct result of bad nutrition and
disease
.
Lord Howard, writing to Elizabeth I three weeks after
the Spanish were driven off, related that "The infection is
grown very great in many ships and is now very dangerous; and
those that come in fresh are soonest infected; they sicken
one day and die the next." [Chatterton, 1913]. This disease
was probably acute enteritis, a direct result of sour beer
acting on malnourished bodies. The direct cost to the Navy
levied by these food related conditions was a loss of man-
power to illness and desertion. Voluntary absence of seamen
often became the only alternative to further mistreatment and
possible death. This drain on experienced crews greatly
reduced the Navy's ability to fight effectively.
The House of Stuart was not much better at running a
Navy. The reign of Charles I saw conditions worsen and muti-
nies become commonplace. In 1627 the crew of the HAPPY
ENTRANCE refused to sail, saying "they would rather be hanged
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as have them starve at sea." The unrest continued and grew
until several hundred men marched on London to plead their
cause directly to King Charles. [Oppenheim, 1896].
During the English Civil War, all but one of the
ships of the Royal Navy deserted the King's service. These
desertions were specifically related to bad food, irregular
pay, and poor leadership. The end result of these facts
was a serious negative effect on operations. Although the
intent of the leaders of the new government was good, con-
ditions improved little under Cromwell. Admiral Robert Blake
wrote to Cromwell late in the summer of 1655 bemoaning the
fact that he could not engage the Spanish because of poor and
inadequate food supplies that greatly weakened his crews.
5 . Eighteenth Century
The 18th century saw many improvements in the tech-
nology of shipbuilding, navigation, and gunnery, but little
was done for the seaman and his food until the arrival of
Admiral Lord Nelson on the naval scene. The demands of the
wars of the period required the "impressment" of large numbers
of landsmen. Among the prime sources of naval recruits were
hospitals, sick quarters, and jails. Thus the crews character-
istically started out in poor health, only to worsen with time
at sea.
In 1759, a ship of 2100 tons was commissioned for
building. She was destined to be the paragon of British ships-
of-the-line for nearly sixty years. In 1765, HMS VICTORY was
launched with a complement of between eight and nine hundred men
21

Her Captain prepared placards, posters, and handbills stating
that special attention had been paid to provisioning and that
crewmen could expect to feed on plenty of fresh meat and grog,
as an alurement to young recruits. These promises of small
comforts, adventure, and prize money seem to have recruited
a few men, but impressment was still the primary source of
manpower. The promise of fresh meat was usually kept in the
form of salted beef and pork. This was often enough so tough
that it was carved into curios by sailors who tired of trying
to eat it after it had been boiled to a rubbery consistancy.
Biscuits were often full of maggots and weevils. The grog
ration often did double duty by both slaking thirst and dul-
ling the sensitivity of the individual's palate. [Callender,
1913]. Cooking was done on a central cook-fire and food was
delivered to individual messes of ten to twelve men each.
The ship's cook in Lord Nelson's time was a warrant
officer appointed by the Commissioner of the Navy. He was
often a pensioner who had lost a limb. The fare he prepared
was rarely more inventively prepared than by simple boiling.
On occasion, peas were added to the brew to reduce the effect
of the salt. His pay was augmented by selling the fat resi-
due skimmed from the boiling kettles. He normally had one
or two assistants, stood no watches, and even had a guard as
he prepared meals to ensure no one would attempt to steal
extra rations. [Masefield, 1905].
With the advent of long sea voyages in the 15th
Century, the primary cause of death became the dread disease
scurvy. What we now know is a simple vitamin deficiency was
22

for nearly three hundred years the devastator of the fleet.
In terms of naval operations, it certainly had a very dele-
terious effect. Commodore Anson's circumnavigation of the
world in 1740-44 paid a high price in human capital when 1051
of the 1955 seamen on seven ships died of scurvy. In 1779 a
Franco-Spanish fleet was totally disabled by a combination of
scurvy and typhus just as they were about to attack the city
of Portsmouth, England. In 1780 the Channel Fleet landed
2400 cases of scurvy at Portsmouth after only ten weeks at
sea. The Spithead mutiny of 1797 was caused in part by the
poor food and incidence of disease throughout the fleet. In
terms of organizational inertia and change, it is interesting
to note that a cure for scurvy was known in the 17th Century
and lost. When Dr. James Lund conducted a controlled dietetic
experiment in 1753, oranges and lemons were identified as
cures for the disease, but the Admiralty took forty- two years
to adopt this knowledge into policy. In 1795 authorities
were persuaded to mix lemon juice with the grog ration. Sir
Gilbert Blane, head of the Sick and Hurt Board, had a thumb
rule stating "every fifty lemons might be considered as a
hand in the fleet." [Lloyd, 1965]. Operationally, it must
be considered as a major factor in the successes of Lord St.
Vincent's blockading fleets (1793-1797) and the victories of
Lord Nelson, since both men were firm believers in the use
of lemons
.
6. United States Navy
Shifting to the United States Navy, the concern for
the seamen of the Revolutionary Navy seems to have been higher
23

than for their British counterparts. The Continental Congress
established "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the
Colonies" in November 1775. These rules covered all aspects
of naval life including the ration allowance and pay scales.
Each day's ration was enumerated by item and weight. Notable
is the inclusion of fresh vegetables - specifically turnips
and potatoes - in the weekly diet. Compared to the British
fare it must have seemed a luxurious prospect to the new
Colonial sailor. If the pay of sailors is used to assess
the relative worth of rates to the Navy, the Steward rated
with the Surgeon's mate and just below the Gunner and
Boatswain. [Clark, 1966]. This relative worth is consistent
with the British naval organization which was no doubt used
as a model by the Colonists.
After the Revolution, the letter of the naval law
related to food was honored by the Mediterranean Squadron
during the Tripolitan Wars. The journal of Hezekiah Loomis,
steward aboard the U.S. Brig Vixen during operations off the
coast of Tripoli in 1804-1806, reveals that the practice for
this force was to provision every two or three days in
Mediterranean ports. Their visits to Sicilian and Maltese
ports were reminiscent of the stops of the early seafarers
of the Mediterranean. [Middlebrook , 1928]. This routine
provisioning had the net effect of maintaining the health of
the crew as well as maintaining a full larder should the need
arise for the ship to embark on extended operations. Such
attention to provisioning was, however, not always the case.
24

By 1842 nutritional conditions had deteriorated and opera-
tions were effected sufficiently to force the Secretary of
the Navy, Abel P. Upshur, to seek action from Congress to
remedy the situation. The result was the "Act to Establish
and Regulate the Navy Ration." This act was designed to in-
crease the quality, quantity and variety of the food ration.
[Anderson, 1966] . An aid to the implementation of the new
ration was the adoption of the process of canning, invented
by Nicolas Appert in France in the early 19th Century.
Between 1842 and the Civil War little change took place in
the ration. The allowance for spirits was discontinued in
1862 but the food service messes continued as before. Food
quality was not much better on long voyages and preparation
was haphazard because of the tradition of "electing" a cook
from each mess to prepare food and clean up after the meal
was finished. [All Hands, 1958]. A technological experiment
that was tried was the use of a refrigerated stores ship for
carrying meats and vegetables to the Union Blockade Fleet
south of Cape Hatteras. This was accomplished by the steamer
RHODE ISLAND that had been fitted with large ice cooled com-
partments. Ultimately the system was extended to serve the
West Gulf, East Gulf, North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and the
Mississippi River Squadrons.
7 . Twentieth Century
Little change occurred until an experiment aboard the
USS INDIANA during the Spanish American War was adopted fleet-
wide in 1902. It was in this year that the concept of the
25

general mess was adopted and institutionalized, ushering in
a new era of feeding at sea. [Navy Supply Corps Newsletter,
1973] . Navy menus were written for all ships for the first
time in lieu of the previous method of passing down "old
favorites" verbally from cook to cook. Mechanical cooling
and steam propulsion had far reaching effects on provisioning.
A ship for the first time could stow foodstuffs for a period
longer than the on-board fuel supply would last. The variety
of food continued to increase and the Navy began to process
its own food. The best example of this was the establishment
of Navy coffee roasting factories in New York and Oakland.
By the onset of World War II, feeding aboard ship was
ready for the next big revolutionary step - underway replen-
ishment at sea. Stores ships were developed to supply com-
batant ships on the high seas, thereby enabling the combatants
to pursue the enemy without regard to land-based supply depots
The first Service Force Squadron was formed in 1944 and was
the first U.S. Navy unit devoted solely to logistic support
on the high seas.
Between World War II and the war in Vietnam, the trend
in food service was to exploit the extant technologies and
utilize innovations in packaging and preservation. Ration-
dense foods were developed as a means of reducing the storage
problem and to further extend the times between replenish-
ments. This is perhaps best illustrated in the submarine
force. The submarine service has gained a reputation as the
best feeding branch of the naval service. The Navy has prided
26

itself in the last fifty years on its high quality food,
often using the promise of quality food as a recruiting
incentive. Even in Vietnam, the Navy was tied to a two to
three week replenishment schedule in order to provide fresh
meats and vegetables to its afloat units. Fleet duty was
often tedious, extended, and dangerous. Food was seen by
crew members as necessary for holding more than body and soul
together - it was considered an important factor in sustaining
morale.
C. EVOLUTION OF FOOD SERVICE RATi'nGS
Before leaving the chronological history of food and naval
operations, it will be useful to look at how the enlisted rat-
ings evolved. Since the days of the Colonial Navy, there has
been a work distinction between Stewards and Cooks, Initially,
the cook prepared meals and the steward (a Warrant Officer)
controlled the edible provisions and the attendant accoutre-
ments. In 1864, the enlisted rating of Steward was created
to serve in the officers' wardroom. By the early 1900's, the
Steward rating had evolved by convention and regulation into
the only rating open to Blacks, Shortly after World War I,
the Steward rating was limited to Filipino and Guamanian
enlistees. This continued until the mid 1930 's when the sheer
size of the Navy forced the manpower planners to enlist a
small number of Blacks to fill out the ranks of the Steward
rating. By 1939 and through the early years of World War II,
Blacks dominated the only rating they were allowed to serve
in. In 1942, Blacks were finally allowed back into the other
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Navy ratings where they had served with honor and distinguished
themselves from the American Revolution until after the Civil
War. When Blacks no longer enlisted to serve in the Steward
rating because of the stigma of racism and subservience asso-
ciated with the rating in the Black community, and to assist
the newly independent Philippines, Filipinos were once again
recruited in large numbers as Stewards. Filipinos dominated
the rating until it was abolished as a separate entity in
1975. [Wright, 1975].
The Cooks rating survived by that name from 1797 to 1948
when it was renamed the Commissaryman rating. This change
recognized the roles of planning and logistics in addition
to food preparation. In 1975, the Commissaryman rating was
merged with the Steward rating to form a new Mess Management
Specialist rating.
Operationally, the history of the ratings has shown a
loss of talent and manhours attributable to racism and racist
encounters during this century. Over the last seventy-five
years continued racial segregation of the Steward rating
helped plant the seeds that culminated in the crippling of
the aircraft carriers, USS Kitty Hawk and USS Constellation,
in 1972. In view of this, there can be little doubt that
both the formal and informal structure of this rating have
to be taken into account as they influence operational readi-
ness.

III. FOOD IN THE MODERN NAVAL ENVIRONMENT
The historical role of food, or lack thereof, and its
impact on naval operations has been addressed in the preced-
ing chapter. But what about food and food service operations
and the modern sailor? What role does food play in influenc-
ing his or her sense of well being and behavior? What are
the implications and results of poor food or food service?
The following section will be concerned with discussing the
biological need for food, food and health, food and morale,
food and the social environment, and food and retention.
Before launching into an attempt to explore the possible
ramifications of food and food service vis-a-vis the modern
sailor, a brief paragraph reflecting the importance of the
Navy's food service operation is quoted from a recent issue
of the Navy Supply Corps Newsletter (1977) :
"There are currently 690 enlisted dining facilities in
the Navy, of which 550 are afloat, 88 are in CONUS ashore
and 52 are overseas ashore. .. .The Navy currently feeds
an average of over 187,000 persons per day, with the cost
of food alone reaching $216 million annually ... which
currently makes the Navy the tenth largest feeding oper-
ation in the United States."
It should come as no surprise that the quality of food service
remains as much a modern concern as it was in the early his-
tory of this country as a seagoing nation.
A. BIOLOGICAL NEED FOR FOOD
Hunger, the desire for food, is one of the human organism's
strongest biological drives, along with the drives relating
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to the need for water, oxygen, rest and sleep. [Zimbardo and
Rush, 1975]. Food and the human organism's use of it has
been of great concern and importance to psychologists, nutri-
tionists, medical doctors, anthropologists, sociologists, and
others in more recent times. One can pick up almost any high
school or college general psychology text and read about
studies conducted concerning man's biological need for food
(hunger), addiction to food (obesity), or food deprivation
(anorexia nervosa)
.
Maslow's now famous hierarchy of human needs involves the
concept of lower level needs and higher level needs with the
former requiring satisfaction before a person can focus atten-
tion on the latter. At the bottom of the lower level needs
are those which he calls "physiological" which include man's
requirement for food, water, air and sex. [Maslow, 1970].
(See Appendix A)
.
Fortunately, with America's advanced technology and
affluence, few people in this country are preoccupied with
satisfying their physiological needs for food and water and
most are free to concentrate their efforts on satisfying their
higher order needs for self-esteem and self -actualization.
One exception to Maslow's need hierarchy might be sailors
at sea who spend months underway thousands of miles from
familiar shores. To these people, the quality and quantity
of food received take on new meaning and significance since
their ship is the sole source of sustenance on an otherwise




"When individuals or groups are under stress, or when
their mobility is hampered, or when their daily routine
is highly standardized, the psychological and social
factors surrounding eating can become as important as
the biological need to subsist and be nourished."
[Rowe, 1976]
.
Hence, the reason the Navy places important emphasis on load-
ing out each ship v\/ith more than adequate provisions prior to
any deployment. It is not too difficult to imagine the
consequences of running out of food at sea.
B. FOOD AND HEALTH
In 1951, the Chief of Naval Operations began to express
concern regarding the relationship between the physical well
being of his men at sea and its impact on the overall effec-
tiveness of the fleet. As a result the Commander, Operational
Development Force was directed to perform a study to evaluate
living conditions aboard naval vessels. The major finding of
the study was that habitability standards within the fleet,
including food service operations, were not consistent with
even Navy minimum standards and had a negative effect on the
health and welfare of naval members. [Commander, Operational
Development Force, 1955].
The relationship between the health of naval personnel
and the quality of food and its sanitary preparation has long
been recognized. Shortly after the completion of the study
just mentioned. Captain Charles W. Shilling, MC, USN, wrote
a book detailing the importance of "clean food." This
publication related food to crew health as well as giving a
detailed account of the various types and causes of food
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poisoning and its disastrous effects on the ability of a
ship to carry out its mission. [Shilling, 1965].
Even the Navy's course manuals for its cooks and stewards
contained numerous references to food-borne illness and its
threat to health, stressing that this type of illness was
usually preventable. [Commissaryman 3^2, 1971 and Steward
3^2, 1971]. Additionally, numerous recent studies by the
Naval Health Research Center [McDonald, 1970; Pugh, et al.,
1975; and Harvey, et al., 1977] have clearly demonstrated
that health, gastrointestinal illness, shipboard living con-
ditions and accidents are directly proportional to the quality
and sanitation consciousness of a ship's food service depart-
ment. While the results of most of the referenced studies
could have been predicted by intuitive or deductive reasoning,
nonetheless they present clear scientific evidence regarding
the connection between food and shipboard health.
Perhaps one of the earliest reminders of the connection
between the health of service members and food was contained
in a War Department Circular dated 1 May 1875 which reads in
part
:
"Remember that beans, badly boiled, kill more than
bullets, and fat is more fatal than powder. In cooking,
more than in anything else in this world, always make
haste slowly. One hour too much is vastly better than
five minutes too little, with rare exceptions." [Deane,
1969] .
While the old proverb of "iron men with iron stomachs"
may have been somewhat comforting in the past when food prep-
aration conditions and food quality were at best primitive
by modern standards, the fact remains that inadequately
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prepared food can cause illness or even death. This is as
true today as it was in 1875.
C. FOOD AND MORALE
Morale of the fighting man has been linked with numerous
factors throughout the course of history, ranging from quality
of leadership to quality of food. Morale has been used
synonomously with "fighting spirit," "the will to win," or
"what makes men fight bravely and endure the hardships of a
long campaign." Organizational psychologists would probably
add that morale is an important measure of the effectiveness
of organizations. Napoleon is reported to have reduced
morale to the following equation: "Morale in relation to
material factors is as three is to one." [Barclay , 1969]. In
other words, an increase in one unit of material comforts or
supplies results in a three-fold increase in morale.
The U.S. Navy, even back in colonial times, recognized
the relationship between good food and high morale. In 1794
the Congress passed the Navy's first ration law which provided
for a fixed allowance of food items per day per man. This
law was later changed in 1933 as a result of increased mil-
itary pressure to provide sailors with a greater variety of
nutritious food. [Davis, 1972].
During and after V/WII, the Navy became more actively in-
volved in studying habitability and its effect on morale and
worker efficiency. One of the earliest studies, completed
by the Commander, Operational Development Force in 1952, was
classified "restricted, security information" indicating the
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importance and sensitivity the Navy placed on the subject of
worker morale and efficiency. In this study the following
example of how food was seen as relating to morale was cited
from a message sent by the USS Mindoro to her type commander:
"Less than a year ago mutterings of 'lousy chow' and
'garbage' could be heard almost any time in and around
the mess deck. Though the expressions were extreme, the
meaning behind the comments was justified, and a large
percentage of food did become garbage as it was scraped
off the trays uneaten, or only tasted. On the average,
the meals for the crew were commonplace, dull, uninter-
esting. ... The way she feeds at present is sufficiently
unique to warrant repeating, and it has her sailors
saying, 'My ship serves shipping-over chow'.... He (the
young sailor) is the future 'backbone' of the Navy, and
to him 'shipping-over chow' has a real meaning. To his
older and more experienced shipmate, good food is just
as important for his morale." [Commander, Operational
Development Force, 1952].
In the past 15 years the Navy has recognized the impor-
tance of keeping pace with the changing food tastes of its
younger sailors by instituting ethnic and specialty foods,
multiple choice menus, speed-line service for hamburgers,
french fries and hot dogs, a la carte breakfasts, salad bars,
dietary foods and carbonated beverage dispensers in messes
ashore. This increased variety has helped morale and also
has the added effect of helping to eliminate what Philip
Connelly, Chairman of the Armed Forces Food Service Committee
of the Food Service Executives Association, describes as
"food monotony" which he claims is a major problem with
"captive" clienteles. [Connelly, 1963].
In Vietnam, good food was reported by one observer to
have been "the largest single factor affecting the morale of
naval forces." [Sutton, 1969]. Given the fact that hostile
34

conditions and terrain ran the gammut from continual active
enemy engagement to rear support operations, sweltering heat
to bitter cold, mountainous jungles to flat rice paddies and
the concommitant extensive logistical arrangements, there is
little room to underestimate the importance placed on food
service and eating during the Vietnam V/ar.
The Vietnam War also precipitated the development of new
concepts in feeding as a result of the uniqueness of the war
and the desire to provide hot, nutritious meals to keep health
and morale at optimum levels. The long-range-patrol food
packet was the first military ration to use freeze-dried foods
and replaced the older and more familiar WVII C-rations as the
primary food source for personnel operating in forward areas.
Portable galleys, disposable food containers and prefabricated
food (e.g., removal of fat and bone in meats) were also used
extensively by U.S. forces. [Anderson, 1972].
While "necessity is the mother of invention" is a trite
and over-used phrase, the Vietnam War certainly stimulated
innovations in feeding operations and necessitated the
development of new concepts in meeting the food needs of the
modern serviceman.
D. FOOD AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
In addition to the major role food plays in determining
the health and morale of Navy personnel, the act of eating
food together can be viewed from a sociological standpoint.
A Navy ship is a community in and of itself. On long deploy-
ments, 80 plus hour work weeks are not uncommon. Much of a
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sailor's time is spent standing watches, operating machinery
and/or sophisticated electronic equipment which can become
routine and monotonous rather quickly. The more arduous and
stressful the duty, the more important becomes eating, both
as respite from the man-machine interface and also as a time
when all hands come together to share in the pleasant task
of dining.
It is during meal activities that persons from different
ethnic backgrounds, geographical origin and social strata
share a common need, i.e., the need for sustenance. It is
a time when social relationships take on added importance in
bringing together a group of diverse individuals who can share
experiences, carry on informal discussions, make important
personal decisions with the help of others, or simply enjoy
the rest and relaxation that comes from eating among friends.
A habitability design study conducted by the Department
of Architecture, University of California, Berkeley, saw
dining and the area provided for it on naval ships in the
following way:
"A ship's messing area can be regarded as more than just
a space in which meals are served and consumed. It can
be defined as a social space where crew members can
change roles and moods from those that occupy them while
on duty at their stations or work areas. Among the many
territories aboard ship, the messing area is a commons
of sort, where crew members belonging to different living
and working groups can meet and socialize. Because of
the restriction of space available for recreation activity,
especially typical of Destroyer type ships where encroach-
ment of armaments and navigation and propulsion equipment
has occurred, multipurpose use of the messing area is
almost a necessity. It is really the only space of
sufficient capacity and availability to accommodate a
sizeable portion of the crew." [Hassid et al., 1973].
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Thus, it can be seen the messing or dining area serves a
dual function. Its primary function is to serve as an area
in which to feed the crew, however, dining itself is often
the major social event of the day. It is the authors' opinion
that the higher the quality of the environment in this area
and the quality of the food served within its boundaries, the
more likely the crew will respond in a positive fashion to
their organizational and social setting.
The importance placed by officers on the activities of
their wardroom is no less than that for sailors in their
dining facility. The purpose of the wardroom is to promote
and maintain the well-being, morale and efficiency of the
officers by providing dining, social and recreational outlets
aboard ship.
The wardroom has often been referred to as an officer's
seagoing home. Here the influence of social norms, customs
and traditions exert a profound influence on the lives of
wardroom members. It is here that camaraderie and esprit de
corps are fostered and important decisions are made affecting
the activities and morale of the entire crew.
Professor Chester A. Wright at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, places a great deal of impor-
tance on the quality of service in the wardroom by stating,
"(it) had a definite bearing on the climate of a ship, the
morale and pride of its officers and the morale and treatment
of its crew." He goes on to say that he "never saw a crack
ship that had a lousy wardroom." [Wright, 1977].
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The role of food service in maintaining morale and pro-
viding the opportunity for social exchange and recreation has
received added emphasis by the Navy in its recent design and
construction of ships. Food service as a system has for many
years been relegated to a secondary role in ship design,
often apportioned left-over space and utility support after
the primary mission support systems and spaces have been
satisfied.
In 1965, habitability was established as a military
characteristic of U.S. naval ships and consequently, food
service designers are now insuring the effective integration
of the food service system into the early design efforts of
naval ships. [Rowe, 1976]. As much emphasis is now placed
on where a person eats as what he eats. How a food service
area looks, smells, sounds and feels influences to a large
degree how one perceives the taste of food.
Even food storage has taken on new dimensions with the
advent of nuclear powered ships. No longer is the cruising
radius of a ship governed by the amount of fuel it can carry,
but now is limited only by the endurance of its crew and the
amount of food it can carry.
It was said centuries ago, "seamen love food above every-
thing else." [Commanders Digest, 1975]. While this phrase
may be somewhat simplistic, food appears to be an important
determinant of morale and as such can be a key variable in




E. FOOD AND RETENTION
Another aspect of food and food service operations that
has received some attention by the Navy recently is how they
relate to a person's desire to join and remain in the Navy
beyond the first enlistment.
One study completed by the Naval Personnel Research
Activity, San Diego, tested the hypothesis that as the dis-
crepancy between the values of an individual and those of the
Navy increases, the probability of his reenlistment decreases
In addition to being perhaps intuitively appealing, the study
did find a strong relationship between "good chow" and the
expectation of the sailor that it would be good as one reason
for joining the Navy over the other branches of service. The
study showed little discrepancy between the values of the
individual and the Navy when it involved serving good food.
[Blumenfeld, 1965].
One of the conclusions reached by the Navy's Office of
Retention Plans and Programs in 1971 was that even though
food and how it was served had long had a strong impact on
a sailor's attitude regarding retention in the Navy, it was
likely that more incentives were going to be needed in the
future. [Schwartz, 1970].
More recently, the whole idea of habitability has been
investigated to determine what, if any, effect it has on
retention of naval personnel. Habitability, as the term is
now used, still involves the activities associated with the
messing area but generally includes the berthing areas.

working areas, sanitary facilities, and recreational facilities
as well.
In 1971, the Center for Naval Analyses published a report
indicating that "mess facilities" ranked sixth in importance
with respect to crew satisfaction, and that satisfaction was
inextricably linked with performance, morale and retention.
[Stephan, 1971] . Another study, completed by the Naval Health
Research Center, went on to show that habitability satisfac-
tion sub-scales were all high for the reenlistee, moderate
for those who were recommended for reenlistment but who chose
to leave the Navy, and low for those not recommended for
reenlistment. [La Rocco et al., 1975].
In a similar study conducted at about the same time as
the one mentioned above, the preliminary findings showed that
shipboard environmental conditions are correlated with health,
satisfaction, performance, and retention of naval personnel.
[Goldman and Segal, 1976].
F . SUMMARY
While health, morale, positive attitudes, worker satisfac-
tion and reenlistment are functions based largely on individual
characteristics and perceptions, their interaction in an en-
vironment as complex and large as the Navy appears to warrant
further study and consideration by upper level management
within the naval organization. The fact that food and food
service appear as common threads throughout these functions
implies the need to remain continually focused on this area.
No other consideration seems to impact as quickly on the
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immediate needs and concerns of naval personnel as the quality
and quantity of their food.
Given the elimination of the draft and the changing value
system of service age people today, these authors would be
interested in seeing a study conducted to determine if food
quality still ranks as high in the value system of young
people joining the Navy today as it did ten or fifteen years
ago.
Evolutionary changes in future shipboard weapons, propul-
sion, electronic and navigation systems can be anticipated
with varying degrees of probability, but the one item that
can be predicted with almost complete certainty is that
sailors and officers will continue to demand and expect high
quality food service a minimum of three times a day in the
foreseeable future.
The following sections will analyze the perceptions and
attitudes of those men and women responsible for daily food




This chapter contains a brief description of the proced-
ures by which data was gathered in analyzing the impact of
the amalgamation of the former CS and SD ratings into the
present MS rating. It also contains a description of how
the data will be used to support the study thesis.
Data for this analysis came from two principal sources.
The first source was the Human Resource Management (HRM) data
bank maintained at the Naval Postgraduate School in the W. R.
Church Computer Center. The second source was a series of
formal structured interviews conducted by the authors in
support of this study.
The current HRiM data bank contains the aggregated responses
of approximately 295,000 naval personnel. These individuals
were respondents to the HRM survey given during the period
1974 through 1976. From the data bank master file, a working
sub-file was created containing the responses of all TN, SD,
CS and MS personnel (N=6594). The breakdown of respondents








The HRM survey data were chosen as a prime data source
for several reasons. The data were readily available and
accessible. The data contained a number of different demo-
graphic variables that could be used in identifying important
characteristics and facts concerning the respondents. Also,
the data covered the period of time both before and after the
amalgamation, i.e., one year before and two years after the
CS and SD merger on 1 January 1975.
At the present time the HRM survey data bank is the only
known and readily available data source that contains a wide
range of information derived from a significant portion of
the MS population within the Navy.
While several other studies, cited in the "Introduction,"
have made limited use of the HRM survey data, this study seeks
to accomplish a more detailed analysis of the HRM survey data.
This result is to be achieved by looking at only the responses
from the MS community, gathered over a much longer period of
time than in the previous studies, i.e., three years vice two.
In deciding what specific pieces of data from the HRM
survey data bank would be useful in this study, several fac-
tors were taken into consideration. First, there was a desire
to use information in the form of responses to either individual
questions or groups of questions, which form survey indices,
from as many of the six major dimensions of the survey (listed
in Appendix B) as possible. This choice would provide a
broader base than other alternatives considered from which to




Second, it was considered important that whatever
questions or indices used remain unchanged over the entire
three-year period to provide some stability to the analysis.
Third, the questions or indices selected should in some
way attempt to measure the areas of self -perception, work
group harmony, peer and supervisory relationships, and job
satisfaction
.
Lastly, it was considered that for a comparative analysis
to be meaningful, Navy normative data should be readily avail-
able for each question or index selected. The normative data
in this case would be question or index means for all respond-
ents from surface, air and submarine commands over the entire
three-year period being used in the analysis.
The decision to use HRM survey indices was driven by the
fact that Navy normative data had been previously computed
and was available from the Naval Personnel Research and Devel-
opment Center (NPRDC) for the survey indices and not for indi-
vidual questions. It should be noted that NPRDC has recently
begun computing normative data for only 16 of the 24 survey
indices due to major changes that have taken place in the
design of the survey. Of these 16 indices, only 11 have
remained relatively constant in question make-up over the
three-year period. When the individual questions comprising
each of these 11 indices were analyzed for question content,
only five indices were considered useful for the purpose of
this study. The five indices are as follows: Human Resource
Emphasis, Supervisory Support, Peer Support, Work Group
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Coordination, and Satisfaction. Five of the six major
dimensions are represented and a list of the individual
questions comprising each of the selected indices is con-
tained in Appendix C. The sixth major dimension, Human
Goals Programs, has no index normative data available for
the entire three-year period due to question changes on the
HRiM survey and was rejected for this reason.
For each index selected, the mean for all MS respondents
was plotted and compared at six-month intervals. The initial
reference period is 1975, using 1974 mean data as a base line
for statistical purposes, since it covers the period one year
prior to the merger. The "mean" referred to in this case and
throughout the rest of this thesis is the index mean which is
defined as the sum of the individual question means in each
index, divided by the number of questions in the index. The
question means are based on a five point response scale rang-
ing from one to five, with one being the lowest or most nega-
tive response and five being the highest or most positive
response. The index means for all MS personnel were also
compared with index means for all surface, air and submarine
! respondents using the same time periods and intervals.
Index means for all MS respondents were also analyzed
according to race by determining the means for all Caucasians,
' Blacks and Filipinos having taken the HRM survey. Another
I
breakdown involved analyzing index means according to pay-





The last analysis involving the HRM survey data used the
information obtained from responses to demographic question
13 (What are your current service plans?) on side one
(demographic side) of the HRM survey response form. Side one
of the response form is contained in Appendix D. A comparison
was made between the percentage of non-Caucasian personnel
within the lower paygrades (E1-E3) and the percentage of
Caucasians in those same paygrades who indicated a favorable
response toward reenlisting in the Navy on question 13.
While the HRM survey data bank is able to provide
statistical-historical data about MS personnel in the Navy,
the authors felt it important to gather and analyze more
current data regarding the perceptions, attitudes and feelings
of those MS's presently serving in the Navy. As a result,
structured, one-on-one, formal interviews were conducted in
the San Diego area during the period 23 January to 10 February
1978. The interviews involved 60 MS personnel from three
afloat commands and two major shore commands.
Access to the three afloat commands was obtained through
the auspices of Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet
(COMTxIAVSURFPAC) in conjunction with scheduled "MS Assist Team"
visits. An attempt was made to interview all MS personnel
assigned to each of these commands. The two shore commands
were selected based on their geographic proximity to the
afloat commands. These two shore commands both had a heavy
concentration of MS personnel with varied operational back-
grounds and experience levels. Again, an attempt was made
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to interview all assigned MS personnel. The protocol used
solicited a limited amount of demographic information as well
as responses to six interview questions. The instrument is
contained in Appendix E.
In order to obtain more accurate responses from the
interviewees and reduce the threat level imposed by the
interviewers, each respondent was assured that his or her
anonymity would be protected and that individual interview
sheets would be destroyed by the authors after the data was
analyzed. All respondents were informed that the data col-
lected would be aggregated and used by the authors in this
thesis and for any other purpose considered useful by the
authors. At the same time, an effort was made to prevent
raising unrealistic expectations on the part of the respond-
I
ents .
While the sample size (N=60) of MS respondents cannot be
considered a stratified random sample in a strict statistical
sense, it does have practical significance in that it was
chosen from various elements of the larger MS population in
1 the San Diego area. However, using criteria suggested by
Warwick and Lininger [1975] , this particular sample may be
inferred as being fairly representative of the larger MS
population in the Navy.
1 The information derived from the interviews was used as
a basis for a comparative analysis of the responses by race
and paygrade for each question. This analysis was conducted
in order to highlight any differences in perceptions,
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attitudes and feelings that exist currently within the MS
sample. The basic analytic strategy employed in using the
interview results was an attempt to ascertain recurring
themes among responses. The intended result was the devel-
opment of an overall picture representative of each signif-
icant racial group in the MS rating.
The following chapter will attempt to analyze and
interpret the developed data. The last section of this
chapter, involving the application of a socio- technical
change model, will utilize the HRM survey data, interview
data and socio-cultural information to assess how the amal-
gamation of the CS and SD ratings has impacted on the goals,
technology, people and structure of the naval organization.
From this analysis process, conclusions and recommendations
will be developed for consideration by those Navy personnel






To provide some insight into the factors leading up to
the amalgamation of the former Steward (SD) and Commissary-
man (CS) ratings, this section attempts to briefly trace
the significant events which led to that decision.
Beginning in 1970, the national political environment
became especially sensitive to issues involving apparent
preferential perquisite treatment of its military officers.
There were public expressions by some Congressional members
that military officers were enjoying a particularly sumptuous
lifestyle. Of particular concern was the employment of a
category of enlisted personnel, including many SB's, whose
apparent sole function was to provide personal services to
senior officers. The fact that many of these enlisted per-
sonnel were non-Caucasian made these alleged Congressional
claims of discriminatory practices of special treatment
appear even more valid and justified. Also, during this era
of involvement in a very unpopular war (Vietnam) , the military
officer was suffering some erosion of public status.
The racially explosive 60's had raised the level of
consciousness of almost every American regarding treatment
and opportunities for minority individuals. The military was
no exception. The military was quick to come to grips with
some of the more volatile issues. Race relations, equal
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opportunity, inter-cultural training, human goals and affirm-
ative action plans were all instituted in an attempt to
achieve racial equality and harmony within the military
services
.
During the period 1970-1974, several important events
occurred as a result of the influences of the prevailing
socio-political climate. Beginning in 1972, enlisted aide
billets for senior officers were drastically reduced from
1700 to 500. The utility of the "closed" mess system for
military officers was increasingly questioned and was eventu-
ally replaced by an "open" mess system. Pentagon and White
House messes also came under attack by Congress. The enlisted
personnel who were assigned to these messes were mostly non-
Caucasian and this was interpreted by some critics as a form
of servitude by a minority group for the predominantly white
officer ranks. [BUPERS Briefing Notes, 1977].
In addition, Admiral E. R. Zumwalt began a four-year tour
as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1970. This CNO was not
only highly committed to racial equality in the Navy, he was
also personally responsible for efforts to eliminate any and
all traces of racial discrimination in the Navy. [Zumwalt,
1975].
The combined effect of Congressional pressure to eliminate
special treatment afforded its senior military officers, in-
cluding anything that resembled servitude by minority personnel,
and a new CNO who became extremely sensitive to racial equality,




The modern SD rating was established in 1948 in conjunc-
tion with the post-WWII changes in the Navy's rating structure
ordered by President Harry S. Truman (Executive Order #9981).
Prior to this time, during the period 1919 to 1932, the rating
had been almost the exclusive domain of Blacks and a few other
minorities (Guamanians, Chinese and Japanese). This was the
direct result of the discriminatory policy that forced all
Black sailors into serving as "messmen" for the officer com-
munity. In 1932, for all practical purposes. Blacks ceased
to be recruited for duty as messmen. Black- messmen were
systematically replaced by recruits from Guam and the
Philippines. [Wright, 1975].
A governmental agreement reached between the United States
and the Republic of the Philippines in 1952, later amended in
1954, allowed the Navy to recruit 2000 male Filipino citizens
each year to serve solely as Stewards. The result of this
agreement over time was to change the racial composition of
the Steward rating from predominantly Black to predominantly
Filipino. [BUPERS Rating Review Board Proceedings, 1971].
By 1970, conditions within the Steward rating could only
be described as poor. Filipinos were being allowed to enlist
in a wider variety of ratings other than the Steward rate.
As a consequence of the increased range of choice, fewer
Filipino citizens entered the Steward rating. Additionally,
the apparent social stigma, an association with forced serv-
itude by minorities, and the menialness of the work, all
contributed to making the rating unattractive to both Cau-




The rating was stagnated at the top because of the high
retention of its senior Filipino members coupled with a
reduction in the number of SD billets available. In 1970
the Navy began to reduce the billet structure from 17,000
to eventually 9,000. One result was that it took an average
of seven years service to make E-4 and almost 13 years to
make E-5. This was over twice as long as in most other rat-
ings. By 1972 the SD rating was more than 201 overmanned and
significantly racially imbalanced, being over 90% Malayan.
[Spillane, 1975]
.
The concept of changing the SD rating or merging it with
another rating was first considered in 1970 as a management
solution to the problems mentioned above. In an attempt to
resolve the problems, the Naval Personnel Research and Devel-
opment Laboratory (NPRDL) conducted several studies (June
1971; July 1971) involving the former SD and CS ratings. One
study concluded that the two ratings were highly comparable
and could be combined into a single rating. The second study
I
concerned a proposal to merge the CS and SD ratings into a
single Food Serviceman (FS) rating with food preparation and
mess management specialties differentiated at paygrades E-6
and E-7.
I
A third study conducted by the Naval Personnel Research
and Development Laboratory (August 1971) gathered the reactions
of Stewards and Commissarymen toward a merger of the two rat-
ings. Data was obtained by using questionnaire responses from
3,465 Stewards and 4,254 Commissarymen. Important factors
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brought out in the study indicated that eight in ten of the
Commissarymen were opposed to any merger, while almost the
same proportion o£ Stewards either favored a merger or were
neutral toward the idea. The study also concluded that a
merger might generate other problems since it would bring
together two major ethnic groups (Filipinos and Caucasians).
These groupings have characteristically developed different
work habits and enjoy different cultural attributes in their
work environments.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel Rating Review Board (1971)
recommended against combining the CS and SD ratings. The
Board felt that there was too much opposition by both CS and
SD personnel to a merger and that the duties performed by
each rating were different enough to warrant separate ratings.
While a considerable amount of preliminary investigation
and study had been done regarding either merging the SD rat-
ing with another or improving the SD rating to make it more
attractive, it was not until early 1974 that Admiral Zumwalt
directed serious examination of a merger of the SD and CS
ratings. In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy (1974),
he proposed disestablishing the CS and SD ratings and forming
a new combined rating called Commissary Specialist (CP)
.
Admiral Zumwalt was relieved as CNO before any merger was
implemented; however, his successor. Admiral Holloway, re-
affirmed the direction that had been taken. In November 1974
the concept of merging the CS and SD ratings into the present
Mess Management Specialist (MS) rating was approved.
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The order set 1 January 1975 as the effective date for the
amalgamation. The implementing directive is contained in
Appendix F.
In 1974, CS and SD rating consolidation milestones were
prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to provide for a
timely and smooth transition for everyone involved. By March
1978, all MS personnel were to have been fully cross- trained
and capable of doing all the tasks required by either the
former CS or SD rates. Advancement examinations that followed
the cross- training period (1975-1978) were to reflect the
merger completion and there would no longer be separate
advancement exams for former CS and SD personnel.
B. HRM SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS
This section contains an analysis of the data used to test
hypotheses related to assessing the impact of the CS and SD
amalgamation. The analysis focuses on personnel attitudes
and perceptions as measured by the Navy's HRM survey.
The first hypothesis is a statement referring to the
entire MS population. Hypotheses two and three are state-
ments concerning specific groups of people within the larger
MS rating. Hypothesis four is a statement relating trends
in reenlistment intentions for Caucasian MS personnel to the





H-j^ - There will be a significant decline in five
selected HRIvl survey indice mean scores for
MS personnel in the one-year period following
amalgamation of the CS and SD ratings:
(1) Human Resource Emphasis (HRE)
(2) Supervisory Support (SS)
(3) Peer Support (PS)




74 75^ 75^ 76, 76^
X 2.96 2.88* 2.82** 3.00 2.94
N 1109 1563 1639 1095 1118
* p < .05




The HRE index measures the perceptions of MS
personnel regarding the amount of concern displayed by the
organization toward its human resources.
The data presented in Table I-l show a statis-
tically significant decline in the HRE index mean scores for
MS personnel during the first and second halves of 1975,
following rating amalgamation on 1 January 1975. Two years
after amalgamation, the index mean score is almost identical
to the pre-merger score.
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Using Navy normative data contained in Appendix
G covering the same time period (1974-1976) , all-Navy HRE
index mean scores showed a general increase. Using simple
linear regression techniques, a correlation coefficient of




74 75, 75^ 76, 762
X 3.49 3.38** 3.48 3.4'9 3.50
N 1111 1567 1645 1101 1124
** p < .01
Table 1-2
The SS index measures MS perceptions of the
degree to which their supervisor fosters feelings of worth
and dignity within the work group.
The data presented in Table 1-2 show a signifi-
cant decline in the SS index mean scores for MS personnel
during the six-month period immediately following amalgamation
Two years after amalgamation, the index mean score is almost
identical to the pre-merger score.
Navy normative data during the period 1974-1976
showed an overall decline (Appendix G) . A correlation coef-





74 75, 75^ 76, 76^
X 3.46 3.48 3.41 3.45 3.46
N 1105
I
1560 1641 1093 1120
Table 1-3
The PS index measures MS perceptions of how well
each work group member enhances each other's feeling of per-
sonal worth.
The data in Table 1-3 show no significant change
during the two-year period following amalgamation.
Navy normative data during the same period showed
a steady increase in index mean scores (Appendix G) . A corre-
lation coefficient of -.50 was obtained between MS and Navy
normative index mean scores.
WORK GROUP COORDINATION
74
'h 75^ 76, 76^
X 3.23 3.15* 3.10** 3.21 3.17
N 1111 1564 1640 1092 1117
* p < .05
** p < .01
Table 1-4
The WGC index measures the perceptions of MS
personnel regarding how effectively their work group members
plan, coordinate and support each other.
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The data presented in Table 1-4 show a significant
decline in WGC index mean scores for MS personnel during the
first and second halves of 1975. Two years after amalgamation,
the index mean score is still below the 1974 pre-merger score.
Navy normative data during the same period showed
a large increase in 1975 followed by an even larger decrease
in 1976 (Appendix G)
.
A correlation coefficient of -.50 was
obtained between MS and Navy normative index scores.
SATISFACTION
74 75, 75, 76, '^2
X 3.23 3.28 3.35** 3.46** 3.43**
N 1107 1564 1643 1096 1123
*:<: p < .01
Table 1-5
I
The SAT index measures the level of satisfaction
perceived by MS personnel with work group members, supervisors,
command, job and career opportunities.
The data presented in Table 1-5 show a signifi-
cant increase in SAT index mean scores for MS personnel during
three of the four six-month periods following amalgamation.
Navy normative data during the same period showed
an increase as well (Appendix G) . A correlation coefficient





b. Interpretation of Results
Three of the five indices show a significant
decline in mean scores following amalgamation of the CS and
SD ratings. One index remained relatively constant and one
showed a significant increase. Four of the five indices show
a strong negative correlation between MS and Navy normative
mean scores. While causality can not be assumed from the MS
survey data, there appears to be a relationship between the
decline of mean scores and the first stages of implementation
of the CS and SD rating merger. This inference is strength-
ened by the strong negative correlation obtained between MS
and Navy normative mean scores during the same time frame,
suggesting that MS data trends were running counter to the
overall Navy trends following the merger.
The results of the data analysis generally support
the hypothesis as stated. While the SAT index did not support
the hypothesis, one possible explanation is contained in the
study done by Szalay and Bryson [1977]. This study indicated
that Filipino personnel, in general, were more satisfied with
the naval organization than other cultural groups. This same
study also suggests that Filipinos tend to be more positive
on opinion surveys than other ethnic groups in the U.S. Navy.
This appears to be due in large part to cultural norms that
discourage open disagreement with authority figures and
organizational procedures, both formal and informal.
Of the 6,594 cases used in this thesis study, 45%
were Filipino personnel. If their responses to questions
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concerning satisfaction are generally higher, as suggested by
Szalay and Bryson, then it would seem reasonable to expect MS
mean scores on the HRM satisfaction index to also be higher,
accounting for the positive gap differences from the all-Navy
normative mean scores contained in Appendix G.
In order to evaluate the impact of the CS and SD
rating amalgamation on the major racial groups comprising the
MS rating, a second hypothesis was developed.
2 . Hypothesis Two
H, - There will be a significant decline in the mean
levels of organizational attitudes of Filipino
MS personnel in the one-year period following
amalgamation of the CS and SD ratings as meas-
ured by five selected indices on the HRM survey:
(1) Human Resource Emphasis (HRE)
(2) Supervisory Support (SS)
(3) Peer Support (PS)












































p < .05, ** p < .01
.^ Table II-l

The data presented in Table II-l show a slight
decline in mean scores for Caucasian and Black MS personnel
during the year following amalgamation. However, during the
first half of 1976, the Caucasians showed a significant in-
crease in their mean scores. The Filipinos, on the other
hand, show a decline in mean index scores during the year
following amalgamation, the decline being statistically
significant at the .01 level during the second half of 1975.
SUPERVISORY SUPPORT










































p < . 05
p < .01 TABLE II-
2
The data in Table II-2 show slight declines in
the index mean scores for Caucasians and Blacks during the
first six months following amalgamation, followed by a slight
increase during the second half of 1975. The Filipinos show
a significant decline in index mean scores during the entire
year following amalgamation. Their index mean scores remain












































A * p < .01
Table II-3
The data in Table II-3 show a slight increase in
index mean scores for Caucasians following amalgamation, and
a slight decrease for Blacks during the first half of 1975,
followed by a slight increase during the second half of 1975
The same pattern is repeated for Blacks in 1976. The Fili-
pinos show a decline in index mean scores during 1975 and
1976 with the decline in the second half of 1975 being
statistically significant at the .01 level.
WORK GROUP COORDINATION








































* p < .05
** p < .01 Table II-4
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The data in Table II-4 show a slight decline in
the index mean scores for Caucasians and Blacks during the
first year following amalgamation, with both groups showing
a slight increase during the second half of 1976 from their
pre-merger mean scores. The Filipinos show a marked decline
during the two-year period following amalgamation with
declines in three of four six-month periods being statisti-
cally significant.
SATISFACTION








































* p < .05
** p < .01 Table II-5
The data in Table 1 1- 5 show increases in index
mean scores for all three racial groups during the two years
following amalgamation. For Caucasians and Filipinos the
increases are statistically significant at the .01 level
during the second half of 1975 through 1976.
b. Interpretation of Results
Hypothesis two was developed on the basis of the
several recent studies referenced in the introduction of this
thesis. [CINCLANTFLT 1977; Nartea 1977]. These studies
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indicated a sense of growing dissatisfaction among Filipino
MS personnel with regard to the CS and SD merger which the
authors felt would be reflected in the HRM survey data. Four
. of the five indices show a decline in mean scores during the
first year following the merger and three of the five indices
reflect a similar decline during the second year following
the merger. Based on this, hypothesis two appears to be
j supported.
Again, causality cannot be inferred on the basis
of the HRM survey data. However, the merger could be a con-
tributing factor in the decline of the indice scores for
Filipino personnel. The satisfaction index was the only
index that did not decline. The fact that the index means
increased for all three major racial groups within the MS
rating in the satisfaction index may be related to the nature
of the questions in this index. Several of these questions
are more global in nature and do not necessarily relate to
the MS rating specifically, making it easier to respond to
these questions by taking a macro perspective of the naval
organization.
No significant decline or increase following the
merger is evident in the five indices for Black MS personnel
which is most likely due to the small sample size. Caucasian
MS personnel also show no significant decline in any of the
five indices. In fact, a significant increase is noted in
two of the indices. Whether this stems from the fact that
the amalgamation may have had a less negative effect on them
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as a group or factors were operating within the larger naval
environment that resulted in their increased mean scores is
unknown at this time and cannot be inferred from the data
presented in proving hypothesis two.
When the data from hypothesis two is compared
with the data from hypothesis one, it is likely that the large
Filipino population within the MS rating (45%) is driving the
HRE, SS, and WGC indice means in a negative direction.
Another question that logically surfaced was what
effect the amalgamation had at different paygrade levels
within the MS rating and would the HRM survey data reflect
any trend in the five indices being used if analyzed according
to paygrade. As a result, hypothesis three was developed.
3 . Hypothesis Three
H-j - During the one-year period following the amal-
gamation of the CS and SD ratings there will
be a more significant decline in organizational
attitudes for E1-E3 paygrades than for all
other enlisted MS paygrade groupings as meas-
ured by five selected indices on the HRM survey:
(1) Human Resource Emphasis (HRE)
(2) Supervisory Support (SS)
(3) Peer Support (PS)





























































k p < .05
p < .01 Table III-l
The data in Table III-l show a significant decline
in index mean scores for El-3 MS personnel during the two-year
period following amalgamation. The data also show a signifi-
cant decline in mean scores at the E4-5 paygrade level during
the second half of the year following amalgamation. In fact,
the second half of 1975 is the only six-month period which
shows a decline in mean scores for all paygrade levels; how-


























































* p < .05
** p < .01 Table III-2
The data in Table III-2 show a decline in mean
index scores for both El-5 and E4-5 MS personnel during the
year following amalgamation. The decline at the El-3 pay-
grades during the first six months following amalgamation is
statistically significant at the .01 level. The mean scores
for El-3 personnel remain below the 1974 pre-amalgamation
level until the second half of 1976 when the score just equals
the pre-amalgamation score.
A slight decline in mean scores is also evident
at the E6 paygrade in three of the four six-month intervals
following amalgamation, but they are not statistically sig-
nificant. Only at the E7-9 paygrades is the mean score for
the last half of 1976 above the 1974 pre-amalgamation score.
However, it is not significantly higher due to the small number































































The data in Table III-3 show a decline in index
mean scores for both the El-3 and E4-5 paygrades following
amalgamation. At the E4-5 paygrades, the decline is statis-
tically significant during the second half of 1975. For the
El-3 personnel, the decline is very close to being significant
at the .05 level during the first half of 1976. At the E6 and
E7-9 paygrades, the trend is generally toward increasing mean
scores following amalgamation, with increases at the E6 pay-
grade being statistically significant during the second half

























































* p < .05
** p < .01
Table III-4
The data in Table III-4 show a general decline
in index mean scores for El-3 and E4-5 MS personnel. For
El-3 personnel, the decline is significant at the .05 level
in the first year following amalgamation and for E4-5 per-
sonnel, the decline is significant at the .01 level during
the second half of 1975 and significant at the .05 level
during the second half of 1976. At the upper paygrade levels,

























































* p < .05
** p < .01
Table III-5
The data in Table III-5 show a significant decline
in the satisfaction index mean score for El-3 personnel imme-
diately following the amalgamation. However, the mean scores
show a slight increase beginning in the second half of 1975.
For the other paygrade levels, there is a general trend toward
increased mean scores following amalgamation.
b. Interpretation of Results
According to the data contained in Tables III-l
through III-5, the most significant declines in indice mean
scores have generally taken place at the El-3 paygrades,
followed closely by the declines at the E4-5 paygrades. All
five of the indices show a decline during the first six months
following amalgamation at the El-3 paygrades, with the decline
being statistically significant in four of the five indices.
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Only in the peer support and satisfaction indices are mean
scores slightly higher than pre-amalgamation scores two years
following the amalgamation.
Paygrades above the E5 level generally tend to
show increases in mean scores following amalgamation. The
few declines that do occur above this paygrade level appear
to be of short duration and are not confined to any one time
period or any particular index. In view of the above,
hypothesis three is generally supported by the HRIvI survey
data.
Again, causality cannot be assumed since many
other variables are unaccounted for which could affect the
indice mean scores. However, it is interesting to note the
results of the data in the Tables III-l through III-5 in
light of the fact that the lower paygrades account for the
overwhelming majority (671) of people serving in the MS rat-
ing. Additionally, at the time of the amalgamation Filipinos
made up the majority of personnel in the E3 through E5 pay-
grades. Whether their dissatisfaction with the amalgamation
accounts for the decline in mean scores in the lower paygrades
is uncertain, but when compared with the information presented
following hypothesis two, the possibility of Filipino person-
nel driving the declines in indice mean scores seems plausible
Assuming the CS and SD amalgamation did have a
more pronounced impact at the lower paygrades, as suggested
by the HRM survey data, other possible explanations exist.
One involves the ambiguity and uncertainty felt by personnel
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serving on their first or second enlistment in the MS rating.
A change in the rating structure, coupled with an impending
change in work assignments and/or location, may have been
more difficult for these personnel to accept due to their
more limited experience and tenure. The shift in work loca-
tion, i.e., from the enlisted dining facility (EDF) to the
wardroom, may have been perceived very negatively, especially
by Caucasian MS personnel, since they would now be doing
former "Steward's work." The generally negative connotation
of racial servitude and the legacy of a history of menial
work associated with the former Steward rating has been
addressed in the beginning section of this chapter.
Another area of concern involves the possible
impact of the amalgamation on reenlistment and/or retention
of Caucasian MS personnel. Of particular interest is whether
or not the Caucasian reenlistment rate has had any signifi-
cant effect on the present racial composition of the MS rat-
ing and what trends can be forecast. As a result of this
question, hypothesis four was developed to test the assumption
that the MS rating might be becoming polarized along racial
lines. In order to do this, data obtained from the Bureau of
Naval Personnel (Pers-611) and responses to question 13 on
p side one of the HRM survey form (Appendix D) were utilized.
4 . Hypothesis Four
H, - During the one-year period following amalga-
mation of the CS and SD ratings, Caucasian MS
L
personnel in their first enlistment will show































• % El-3 Caucasian intending to reenlist
• • % Non-Caucasian in El-3 paygrades
O % Non-Caucasian in E4-5 paygrades
-| U% Non-Caucasian in E6-9 paygrades
Note 1: Actual percentages contained in Appendix H.
The information contained in Figure 1 shows a
general decline in the percentage of Caucasian MS personnel
in paygrades El-3 indicating either a response of "plan to
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remain on active duty at least until eligible for retirement"
or "reenlist or extend but undecided about making the Navy a
career" to question 13 of the HRM survey. This information
is based upon a sample of 1,295 Caucasian MS respondents to
the survey serving in their first enlistment during the period
1974 through 1976. This downward trend is further supported
by a recent memorandum to all Supply Corps officers [Grinstead,
1977] indicating that only 18% of all first term MS personnel
were being retained on active duty beyond their first enlist-
ment.
b. Interpretation of Results
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals a definite decline
in the percentage of Caucasian MS personnel intending to re-
enlist and also a reduction in non-Caucasian inputs to the
lower enlisted paygrades in the MS rating. The percentage of
non-Caucasian personnel serving in paygrades El-3 declined
from 54% to 21%. This situation, uncorrected, can only result
in a i>^orsening shortfall of mid-level petty officers in the
very near future.
The top two lines in Figure 1 show that the upper
paygrades in the MS rating are composed largely of non-Caucasian
personnel (predominantly Filipino) and that their percentage
of the entire MS rating at these paygrades has only declined
slightly since amalgamation. The percentage of non-Caucasian
personnel serving in paygrades E4-5 declined from 75% to 64%




By combining the bottom two lines and comparing
the result with the aggregation of the top two lines in
Figure 1, it becomes rather apparent that the MS rating is
becoming more racially polarized. The present picture shows
non-Caucasians steadily dominating the upper paygrades and
Caucasians increasingly comprising the lower paygrades. The
situation at the lower paygrade levels was further highlighted
during a recent interview with the Director of the MS Class
"A" School in San Diego [Nelson, 1978]. The director dis-
cussed a brief analysis in which a racial profile of the CY
'77 class was estimated. This analysis suggested that over
90% of the most recent input to the MS "A" school was Caucas-
ian. Approximately 1% of the school input was estimated to
be Filipino with the remaining 8 to 9% being primarily com-
posed of Blacks and Hispanics.
Clearly, the trend in ethnic distribution of MS
personnel is toward an ever widening racial gap. This gap is
most pronounced between the upper and lower paygrades in the
MS rating and is further aggravated by the shrinking number
of Caucasians expressing any intent to reenlist during their
first enlistment. Therefore, it is concluded that hypothesis
four is supported.
While this section has attempted to look at the
impact of the CS and SD amalgamation through the use of
"historical" data contained within the HRM survey data bank,
the following section in this chapter continues to focus on
the impact of the amalgamation and its attendant issues by
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using "real time" information gathered from recent interviews
of active duty MS personnel in the San Diego area.
C. INTERVIEW RESULTS
In an attempt to provide a current assessment of how MS
personnel feel about their rating, approximately three years
following amalgamation of the CS and SD ratings, 60 interviews
were conducted in the San Diego area. Three representative
afloat commands, consisting of a CG, FF and LST, were visited
for the purpose of interviewing all assigned MS personnel.
Two shore sites with a heavy concentration of MS personnel,
one being a Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) and the other the
Naval Training Command (NTC) , were also visited for the pur-
pose of conducting interviews. At NTC, a total of 17 MS "A"
School staff members and MS "C" School students were inter-
viewed. The "C" School students were from various fleet and
shore activities, several being located outside the San Diego
area. A more complete demographic profile of the interviewees
is contained in Appendix I
.
Of the 60 MS personnel interviewed, 26 were Caucasian,
27 were Filipino and 7 were from other ethnic or cultural
backgrounds. A summary of the information obtained from each
of these racial groups and the authors' conclusions are
presented in the remainder of this section.
1 . Caucasians
The overwhelming majority of the 12 Caucasians who
served in the CS rating prior to amalgamation expressed the
attitude that the present rating is less desirable and less
76

satisfying than their former rating. Their perception is
that rating promotions have slowed, especially at the E-5
and above levels. This group expressed a strong dislike for
working in the wardroom area and preferred instead to work
in the enlisted dining facility (EDF) . They indicated having
strong negative feelings regarding amalgamation ever since it
took place.
For the entire group of Caucasians, the mean age was
23.6 years and the mean time in service (TIS) was 5.0 years.
Their mean age at enlistment was 18.6 years, making their
enlistment age about the same as that of the present inputs
to the MS Class "A" School (19 years). Most of the younger
members of this group stated they enlisted with the idea of
"checking out" the Navy and then trying to get a "better" job
in the civilian community when their enlistment expired.
Of the 14 Caucasians interviewed serving on their
first enlistment, 50% said they were not going to reenlist,
43% stated they were undecided, and only one said he was
definitely going to reenlist. The one individual who stated
he was going to reenlist was serving in submarines and was
submarine qualified. While the number of MS ' s interviewed
serving in submarines was very small (N=3) , all three were
far more positive about being in the MS rating, and two indi-
viduals indicated they were definitely making the Navy a
career
.
Only four of the 26 Caucasians indicated they would
have liked to have had more cross- training and more opportunity
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to learn the skills required of the former SD rating during
the period following amalgamation. The remainder were of the
opinion they already knew enough about wardroom job require-
ments, either from past experience or formal school training,
to enable them to satisfactorily perform in the wardroom
environment
.
Of the 26 personnel interviewed, 20 stated they did
not like working for minority petty officers, especially
Filipinos who had been former Stewards. They viewed the MS
rating as being top heavy with Filipinos and indicated a
sense of polarity within their work group along racial lines,
i.e., themselves being in one camp and the Filipinos in the
other.
These same 20 Caucasians perceived the Filipinos as
being clannish, hard to get to know, overly critical of their
work, strict disciplinarians, unwilling to accept new ideas
(especially from subordinates) and incompetent in managing
EDF operations. Generally, their attitude was that they would
work with but not for a Filipino unless he was "really sharp."
Some stated they thought Filipinos made rate as a result of
longevity in the service vice being skilled or knowledgeable
in their new rating.
Of the six Caucasians who did not perceive any racial
problems between themselves and other races within their work
group, five had less than 18 months active duty service and
their average TIS as a group was less than 10 months. The
sixth individual who stated he did not perceive any problems
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between Caucasians and Filipinos worked in a BOQ setting, had




Overall, the Filipinos expressed a feeling that the
MS rating is better than their former rating in terms of pro-
motion opportunities and job challenge. The amalgamation was
viewed as a chance for improving their job status and self-
esteem within the naval organization.
The mean age of the Filipino group was 36.8 years and
the mean TIS was 13.9 years. Their mean age at enlistment
was 22.4 years, which is considerably older than the average
age of students entering MS "A" School. Collectively, they
saw the Navy as a stepping stone to better economic status
and enlisted with the primary expectation of remaining in the
(
Navy for a 20-year career and the accrued retirement benefits.
Without exception, the 27 Filipino personnel inter-
,
viewed indicated they would retire as soon as they reached 20
years of active service. This objective was considered so
important that most interviewees voluntarily disclosed that
any attempt to alter the Navy's present retirement program
would result in their leaving the Navy at the first opportunity
Seventeen of the 26 Filipino personnel indicated they
received little or no cross- training following amalgamation
in operating an EDF. They were of the opinion that their
commands had moved very slowly, if at all, in attempting to
afford them any opportunity for additional training in
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lanI EDF operations. All 17 felt they needed more training thj
they received to successfully compete with former' CS person-
nel in the EDF environment and on advancement examinations.
The remaining 10 individuals who did not express any cross-
training problems were either former CS personnel or had the
good fortune to be at a command which conducted a rigorous
cross-training program immediately following the amalgamation.
Sixty percent of the Filipinos interviewed indicated
that Caucasians and Filipinos had some difficulty working
together in the MS work group. Senior Filipino petty officers
perceived the younger Caucasian personnel as being lazy, un-
willing to work for Filipinos, and hard to motivate. They
expressed a working knowledge of leadership principles and
felt they had extended themselves in every way to gain the
support of junior Caucasians but had been generally unsuccess-
ful.
Filipino personnel perceived they were often rated
unfairly by their Caucasian seniors, both officer and enlisted,
with respect to their leadership abilities displayed in the
EDF area. They also rated communication difficulties high on
their list of perceived problem areas, but viewed this more
as an excuse used by Caucasians to justify their discriminatory
behavior.
3. Others
^ Of the remaining interviewees, there were three Blacks,
two Mexican Americans, one American Indian and one Hawaiian.
Two Black MS personnel stated they did not like being in the
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MS rating. The remaining individuals expressed a more
positive feeling toward serving in the rating and two indi-
cated they were going to reenlist. The other three were
uncertain about their reenlistment intentions.
Collectively, the "other" group viewed the Caucasian
and Filipino MS ' s as having the most difficulty communicating
and working together. This group indicated an awareness that
most junior Caucasian personnel resented working for senior
Filipino petty officers. They were more positive regarding
their own working relationships with Filipino personnel, but
like most of their Caucasian peers, tended to view Filipinos
as clannish, using their native language in the presence of
other MS ' s when English would have been more appropriate, and
having difficulty managing EDF operations, especially if they
were former Stewards.
4. Interpretation of Results
Based on the interview results, there appears to be
a pronounced level of dissatisfaction and irritation among
many members of the MS rating at the present time. Reasons
for this apparent dissatisfaction and irritation, expressed
by the interviewees, range from unmet expectations, poor
quality of work life, and abuse from the crew, to inept
supervision, slow advancement, and lack of formal training.
Young first-term Caucasians are expressing their dis-
content with being in the MS rating by "voting with their
feet" as evidenced by the fact that only one of those inter-
viewed stated a definite intention to reenlist. This trend
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was analyzed in the previous section using HRM survey data
for the years 1974-76. The results of the interview data,
coming some two years later, suggest this negative reenlist-
ment trend is continuing and may become even more exaggerated
in the very near future.
It is the opinion of the researchers, however, that
I the real problems in the MS rating today lie more in the areas
of self-esteem, self -perception, interpersonal and inter-
cultural relationships. Few MS personnel interviewed expressed
a high degree of professional pride in their work. They gen-
erally viewed their rate as subordinate or less important
r than other ratings to the overall mission accomplishment of
I
their commands. There generally seemed to exist a sense of
I
few rewards being available to an MS person even if one did
his or her very best.
The lack of communication skills and mistrust evi-
denced among members of the MS rating, especially between
I Caucasians and Filipinos, may be of critical importance in
f
understanding some of the current issues in the rating.
Junior MS personnel tend to perceive that their senior petty
officers care little about them as individuals or shipmates.
This feeling was particularly pronounced when the junior
individual was from one racial group and the senior was from
another. Consequently, perceived racial discrimination in
work assignments and performance evaluation marks existed for
both junior Caucasians and Filipino personnel. These imbal-
ances in assessment appear to have fostered increased feelings
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of mistrust and suspicion. The Filipino MS ' s are not only
different racially and culturally, but also tend to be much
older than their Caucasian counterparts. This culture and
age discrepancy may be adding yet another dimension to the
perceived differences causing friction between the two groups.
The intensity of feelings reached aboard one command was
reported by one interviewee to be "all out war"!
Caucasian and Filipino personnel alike seem to possess
a lack of understanding and awareness of each others' cultural
background, heritage and value systems. As a result, percep-
tions often appear to take on racial overtones. This racial
coloration tends to further inhibit communication flow between
individuals. Communication blockages seem to create a situa-
tion which only increases the polarity of members within the
MS work group according to race.
The preceding interview data, if representative,
suggests an apparent polarization of attitudes and perceptions
along racial lines within the MS rating. To further test for
this possibility, an analysis of variance was performed, using
the same HRM survey data as in the preceding section, to
determine if Caucasian and Filipino perceptions of the naval
organization were homogeneously distributed with relation to
each other in 1974. The analysis of variance was again per-
formed using HRiM survey data from the last half of 1976 to
determine if any change had occurred in the relationship of
the distributions over time. A complete table of the result-
ing F-ratios is contained in Appendix J.
L

The F-ratios obtained suggest that the distribution
of survey scores around the mean of the five indices, used
in the preceding section to measure perceptions of the
organization, were not significantly different for Caucasian
and Filipino respondents in 1974. The F-ratios obtained for
1976 show that significant differences existed in four of the
five indices (Supervisory Support, Peer Support, Work Group
Coordination, and Satisfaction).
When each racial group was analyzed separately between
1974 and the last half of 1976, Caucasian respondents showed
no significant difference in distribution in all five indices
while Filipino respondents showed significant shifts on three
of the five indices (Human Resource Emphasis, Supervisory
Support, and Satisfaction).
What the F-ratios suggest is that in 1974 the CS and
SD personnel were clearly defined separate groups who per-
ceived the naval organization with similar distributions about
a mean indice score. In 1976, the people serving in the new
MS rating, designed to unify and consolidate all food service
personnel, apparently have a much greater diversity of percep-
tions about the organization.
One conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that
the information derived from the interview data, i.e., the
perception that a racial polarity exists within the present
MS rating, is supported by statistical analysis. It would
appear likely that the process of amalgamation has not suc-
ceeded in developing a single unified group. What seems to
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have occurred is the emergence of clearly definable racial
subgroups which are very likely more dissimilar perceptually
than before the amalgamation.
A second conclusion is that the genesis of the cur-
rent state of polarity within the MS rating was most likely
discernable from HRiM survey data as early as 1976. The usage
of such data analysis, to monitor the progress of organiza-
tional change, may be an untapped resource for managers in
the naval organization. This analysis might allow for early
assessment of progress and/or problem identification precip-
itated by organizational changes.
D. SOCIO-TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
The preceding analysis provided a sense of the perceptions
and attitudes of individuals serving in the MS rating. V/hile
this information furnishes helpful clues and additional in-
sight to the issues addressed in the Introduction, it remains
only a piece of a much larger picture. At this point, it is
difficult to separate the valuable from the less important in
the amalgamation picture. Are the interactions and difficul-
ties found through data gathered at the perceptual level,
significant problems in and of themselves, or are they perhaps
symptoms of a larger issue?
To facilitate the development of an organizationally useful
answer to this question, Leavitt's [1964] model of socio-
technical change was chosen as a vehicle for further analysis.
This model separates systems into four interrelated, interactive
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subsystems through which to view organizational change.
These categories are summarized in Figure 2 on page 87.
The arrows in Figure 2 represent the possible interactions
among component parts of the model. It should be noted that
in addition to the primary interactions of the components,
many times there are secondary and tertiary reactions. The
model, as shown, does not take into consideration the impact
of the environment on the organization. Important environ-
mental influences will be discussed along with the component
analysis of each of the major model parts.
Since Navy planners did not use this systemic model to
guide the changes made in the food service ratings, all of
the possible interactions between subsystems were not dealt
with as separate entities in the planning and implementation
phases. The potential utility of the model lies principally
in its delineation of the multiple subsystem interactions.
1 . Goal Subsystem
In relating the CS and SD amalgamation decision to
this model, the change process was most probably initiated
through the Goal Subsystem Component. Environmentally, an
increased racial awareness on the part of the United States
society, and Congress in particular, coupled with the con-
commitant sensitivity to any organizational practice that
even hinted of institutional racism, led the Navy to recognize
the de facto existence of the SD rating as a separate racial
sub-group in 1971. The adoption of the Human Goals Program
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the systems of communications
and work flow in organizations.
Figure 2

to institutionalize it helped to stimulate this increased
racial awareness. Internally, the Navy had established goals
for manpov\fer utilization and retention. Failure to meet these
goals became a prime motivating factor in the decision to
combine the CS and SD ratings. It had become obvious to per-
sonnel planners that ostensibly similar ratings were exper-
iencing very different manning and retention levels. In
general, the CS rating was undermanned and the SD rating was
overmanned, based on the actual billet requirements. One
consequence was inequitable advancement; promotions in the
CS rating were much more rapid than in the SD rating.
[Spillane, 1975]. The proposed organizational change to
achieve these manning goals and alleviate the personnel
inequity was primarily structural in nature (amalgamation)
.
2 . Structure Subsystem
The impact of this structural change was felt in all
of the other three components. The effect of structural
change on food service technology was an expansion of the
technical skills and knowledge required for all members of
the new rating by almost 30%. This technological requirement
had been anticipated by the Navy hierarchy. A study was com-
missioned in 1971 to determine the degree of occupational
similarity between the CS and SD ratings. [Naval Personnel
Research and Development Laboratory, July 1971] . This study
concluded that 71% of the CS and SD rating qualifications
were identical, comparable, or related. The most significant
differences analyzed occurred at the E-6 level and centered
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on the differing administrative requirements for the enlisted
and officer mess operations. The basic conclusion was that
it was both feasible and desirable to combine the two food
service related ratings. The Bureau of Naval Personnel Rating
Review Board (1971) dealt, in part, with the possible impacts
of structural change on technology. The Board identified a
series of possible problems resulting from the proposed change
One such problem was qualification compatibility, which was
felt at the time to be similar in definition but different in
magnitude, scope, and implementation between the CS and SD
ratings
.
The technology of these food service ratings is rel-
atively stable when compared to some of the more technical
ratings [e.g.. Electronics Technician (ET) or Firecontrol
Technician (FT)]. However, the greatest impact on organi-
zational structure is generated by the relatively people in-
tensive nature of this technology. The number of personnel
required to conduct food service operations on board ship has
not been greatly reduced in the past seventy-five years by
innovation in either provisioning or preparation techniques.
This personnel intensive factor is evidenced by the fact that
the MS rating is the third largest rating in terms of sheer
numbers in the entire United States Navy enlisted structure.
The technology subsystem helps drive the structural in the
Navy by defining the specific job requirements. These func-
tional requirements are translated into tasks which become
the basis for determining manning levels and rate structure.
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This technology driving structure phenomenon was partially
addressed by the Rating Review Board when billet numbers and
definitions were examined.
3 . People Subsystem
Perhaps the greatest effect of the structural change
of rating amalgamation has been on the people subsystem. To
ascertain the likely perceptions and reactions of CS and SD
personnel toward a possible merger, a study was made by the
Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory. [August,
1971] . This study was based on results from a questionnaire
mailed to CS ' s and SB's in May of 1971. The survey sample
numbered a total of 7,719 responses and was considered repre-
sentative of the entire food service population. This study
concluded: (1) the majority of Stewards were generally
satisfied with the Navy but less than satisfied with their
rating, (2) the majority of Commissarymen were satisfied with
both their rating and the Navy, and (3) consolidation would
result in an increase in satisfaction for Stewards and a
decrease in satisfaction for Commissarymen. The two most
negative aspects about the proposal were expressed by the
Commissarymen who disliked the prospect of cleaning officers'
living quarters and serving food "waiter style." The most
positive aspect for all survey respondents was satisfaction
in learning the skill of cooking.
The study's final conclusion dealt with the problems
inherent in bringing together two major ethnic groups which
have historically remained identifiably distinct within
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the organization. The possibility of conflicts arising
simply from basic cultural differences was addressed by the
study group. A dynamic program for acculturation was recom-
mended in the study report to reduce or eliminate these
likely conflicts.
In addition to these interactions, the literature
suggests that major change, in and of itself, would generate
tension for members who move from one work setting into an-
other. To help alleviate this change induced problem, a
policy of rotational cross- training was recommended to be
contained in the implementing directive. Judging from the
concern voiced by the Chief of Naval Operations in a personal
message to major fleet and shore commanders in November of
1975, implementation of the initial amalgamation order
(Appendix F) may have been slowed by organizational inertia.
This issue of cultural conflict was still a matter of concern
as late as 1977 to personnel planners within the Bureau of
Personnel. [BUPERS Briefing Notes, 1977].
The advancement of larger numbers of CS than SD per-
sonnel, in the fall of 1974, was viewed by some Filipino
Stewards as a manifestation of institutional racism. This
was perceived as a practice which ran counter to the espoused
reasons behind the merger. The organizational decision re-
garding food service personnel advancements impacted heavily
and negatively on the Filipino community. As recently as
August 1977, official correspondence was still being initiated




The cultural differences predominant in the CS
and SD ratings were not officially addressed in the implement-
ing plan and directives. The results of the analysis of HRM
survey data and interview data presented in Sections B and C
of this chapter point to the need for further exploration in
this area. The fact that the SD rating was a relatively
isolated, organic, racial sub-group of the organization made
it easier for the Filipino culture to remain essentially un-
changed by the majority Caucasian-American culture, especially
in the area of interpersonal relationships. The social values
in the Filipino culture which most affect interpersonal rela-
tionships are almost diametrically opposed to the analogous
American social values. The Philippine culture centers pri-
marily on tvv^o social values: first, family centered loyalty
and secondly, a shame orientation. Children throughout their
maturation are encouraged to develop group dependence. Overt
expressions of anger are discouraged. Individual excellence
is often subjugated to group production. To excel would
draw attention to an individual and bring shame to one's
friends who could not do as well. Success is measured as a
function of education, religious observance, and provision
of some semblance of an inheritance for the family. [Duff,
1973]
.
The concepts of social acceptance, personal
honor, and dignity define the Philippine value termed "amor
proprio." This important social value usually results in
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very polite, formal relationships outside of the family group.
It is sometimes manifested to the extreme condition of implied
agreement with another when no agreement actually exists. In
the Philippine culture, intermediaries traditionally serve as
social dampening agents to insure no aggravation results from
interpersonal exchanges.
How does this compare with the generally accepted
individual values of the American culture? A conflict is
likely almost immediately because the American places a high
value on independence, autonomy, personal excellence, and
directness of communications. What are the logical outcomes
in the shipboard environment of merging people with distinct
cultural values into a single rating? One likely outcome is
the exclusion of other races from friendship by Filipinos.
The Filipinos may be reluctant to incur additional primary
social obligations by extending their family relationship to
those of another culture. These actions leading to non-
involvement thus avoid the incurrance of a "debt of primary
obligation" (utang na loob) . A second result producing re-
sentment toward the merger by Caucasians would likely be
generated on several levels: resentment of the introduction
of new work group members, resentment of different leadership
styles, and suspicion of an unfamiliar racial minority. As
evidenced by the interview data in this chapter, young Caucasian
Americans are not comfortable with close, meticulous super-
vision; often viewing this as impuning their abilities and
endangering their independence. The value placed on autonomy
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and independence by the typical young Caucasian is very
pronounced in our society. [Bowers, 1975]. While these
values may be subordinated upon entering the Navy, they are
apparently not completely discarded.
Conversely, the interview data indicated that
Filipino supervisors were often frustrated because their
methods for teaching and leading that were successful when
directing the activities of other Filipinos were not as suc-
cessful with young Caucasian personnel. The reaction of some
Filipino supervisors was to become even more directive and
seemingly arbitrary toward their subordinates. Motivation
of workers is often difficult in a heterogeneous group under
the various constraints of military life. This is compounded
when the group is infused with a sizeable input of personnel
whose cultural values utilize a completely different set of
motivators
.
4 . Secondary Reactions
There are also possible secondary effects attendant
to this change that may result during interaction with crew
members external to the rating. One example is the creation
of a "Rotational Pool" for non-designated seamen to act as
compartment cleaners in the officers' quarters aboard ship.
This action is likely to affect the attitudes of other young
seamen who observe their peers performing such duties. This
may be construed among peer groups as unwarranted servitude,
thereby increasing the negative reaction to performing these
duties. Crew members perceiving discord among the MS ' s may
extrapolate this perception into generalities about the
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character of racial groups. They may also correlate this
projection with the quality of food service, thereby exacer-
bating whatever problems may already exist. The interview
data in Section C of this chapter revealed a sense of frus-
tration on the part of junior MS ' s as a result of the crew's
lack of appreciation of the sustained effort required to
provide quality food service. This phenomenon is not new or
unique but, intuitively, if the work group is split and exper-
iencing internal discord, the members will be less able to
deal effectively with outside irritants.
Discord within the rating will very likely affect
attainment of organizational goals. The analysis of data in
Section B of this chapter has indicated that this may be hap-
pening or at least contributing to the lack of attainment of
retention goals. There is also a probable impact on other
crew members whose cooperation is necessary for achieving
organizational goals, i.e., if the crew is poorly fed, their
productivity may be adversely affected. Similarly, if food
is well prepared, the crew may be more receptive to fulfilling
their organizational roles. In any event, discord along ra-
cial lines runs counter to the intent of the policy and goals
outlined in the Navy's Human Goals Program. Additionally,
desired habitability goals may be harder to achieve if food
service is negatively affected. Finally, the atmosphere and
quality of food service operations may be seen to directly
affect the attainment of the Navy's fourth mission of diplomacy




The people component may also negatively affect
technology, particularly if equipment is damaged in the
j
cross- training process. In the case of food service, the
accounts and records can also be considered technologically
based tools of the rating and are susceptible to error as
people begin to learn new techniques and accounting systems.
Therefore, management techniques may require some modifica-
tion as people adjust to the new structure.
In summary, the early steps toward amalgamation and
the implementation phase have concentrated on preparing rating
members for changes within the structural and technical com-
ponents of the Leavitt model. Less extensive preparation was
made in the people component. The most pressing issues facing
the rating today appear to be in the area of interpersonal/
intercultural relations. This is a problem rather than a
symptom at the work group level. At the more abstract organ-
izational level, these problems are symptoms of the need for
improved planning for organizational change.
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BVI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO?vlMENDATIQNS
A. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY
The following are the major conclusions of this study:
1. The food support system has historically been a key
element in the accomplishment of naval operations. Its
impact on morale, retention, quality of work life and worker
satisfaction has only recently been studied using rigorous
scientific methods. The importance of and the potential for
negative impact of food service operations within the naval
organization continues to be eclipsed by the attention given
to the rapidly changing technology in naval hardware systems
and platform design. Yet throughout the study, one theme
continues to recur. The MS rating in the U.S. Navy possesses
the capacity to directly affect the well being of every
officer and enlisted member.
2. While a structural and technological amalgamation of
the former CS and SD ratings has been ostensibly completed,
a perceptual and attitudinal amalgamation has not occurred
on the part of Caucasian and Filipino members serving in the
MS rating.
3. The decision to amalgamate the former CS and SD
ratings was well researched and organizationally rational.
However, the implementation phase of this organizational change
concentrated heavily on the structural and technological fac-




4. Both the Caucasian and Filipino racial subgroups
within the MS rating are experiencing a sense of organiza-
tional anxiety and frustration as a result of the amalgama-
tion. Major sources of irritation perceived by the Caucasian
subgroup include:
a. Slower advancement.
b. Domination of upper paygrades by former SD personnel.
c. Lesser competence of former SB's to manage EOF opera-
tions .
d. Image of wardroom duties as servitude and former
"nigger" work.
Major sources of irritation perceived by the Filipino subgroup
include
:
a. Institutional racism and discrimination in promotions
and evaluations.
b. Caucasian disrespect and resentment in working for
Filipino petty officers.
c. Lack of adequate training and preparation in EOF
operations following amalgamation.
d. Having a "language problem" stereotype.
e. Being viewed as "second rate" leaders and petty officers.
5. The majority of MS personnel lack a positive self-image
of themselves in their role as food servicemen. Factors influ-
encing this image are:
a. Lack of recognition and support by command.
b. Failure of MS personnel to appreciate the marketability
of food service skills in the civilian community.
c. Excessive negative feedback from the crew concerning
food quality, quantity and service.





e. Cognitive dissonance resulting from high expectations




Senior petty officer role models for younger MS
personnel lack esprit, professionalism and positive
attitudes toward service in the MS rating.
6. Many members of the MS rating are still unclear
regarding the reasoning behind the amalgamation decision.
There tends to exist a general lack of understanding of the
social, political, environmental, organizational, economic,
and managerial factors which necessitated the organizational
change.
7. Intercultural conflict and friction, especially
between Filipino and Caucasian personnel, permeate the MS
rating at all levels. An apparent major source of intercul-
tural conflict is the widely divergent managerial styles used
by Filipino and Caucasian petty officers.
8. IVithout a marked improvement in the retention of
first-term MS personnel, a void will soon exist at the mid-
level paygrades. This situation has the potential to further
aggravate and intensify the racial polarity that already exists
between the upper and lower levels within the MS rating hier-
archy. Additionally, this is likely to have the consequence
i
of creating a scarcity of qualified senior level supervisors
in the long term future.
9. The Navy's fourth mission, involving overseas diplo-
macy, could be seriously jeopardized if social functions
hosted for foreign officials and dignitaries are catered by
poorly motivated, improperly trained, dissatisfied, unprofes-
sional and insensitive food service personnel.
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10. Based on the results of this study, HRM survey data
may be a potentially useful tool for managers of organiza-
tional change to monitor and assess personnel attitudes and
perceptions on a near real time basis.
11. As a result of the amalgamation, the people problems
that currently exist within the MS rating have the potential
to impact negatively on battle readiness and mission accom-
plishment. They are of such magnitude, intensity and perva-
siveness that immediate steps should be initiated to ensure
the survivability of the MS rating as a viable entity in the
naval organization.
These conclusions are based on the authors' analysis of
HRM survey data, interview data, and an extensive review of
the literature dealing with habitability and food service
support systems in the Navy. Additional ideas and informa-
tion related to these conclusions were obtained from informal
discussions with naval officers, enlisted personnel other than
interviewees, and Naval Postgraduate School faculty members.
While the conclusions are not exhaustive by any means,
they do represent the significant ideas that were garnered
from the basic research conducted. They focus attention on
the human element within the naval organization as being the
critical component that will ultimately determine the degree
of success achieved by the amalgamation.
B. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF STUDY
The recommendations growing out of the conduct of this
study will be divided into rating- specif ic and Navy- specif ic
categories. The former will be addressed to immediate issues
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that exist in the MS rating and the latter to those interested
in instituting managed change in the larger organization.
They will also include the need for future research in the
area of human resource management. The first six recommen-
dations are primarily related to the MS rating and the last
three are of a more nomothetic nature.
Recommendation A
The present self-image of MS personnel is weak and needs
considerable improvement. Therefore, the following actions
are recommended:
1. Emphasize the marketability of professional catering,
hotel and restaurant management, and culinary skills inherent
in the MS rating. This might begin as early as during the
recruitment phase.
2. Establish a highly visible apprenticeship training
program in the MS rating that is recognized by civilian food
service oriented professional organizations and societies.
3. Establish a suitable reward system at the command
level to increase recognition of individual food service per-
sonnel, e.g., conduct cooking/baking competition with winners,
selected by the crew, to receive letters of recognition from
the commanding officer with appropriate copies to parents/
spouse and service record. Winners could also be given the
opportunity to spend several days training with a professional
civilian chef/caterer in the local community.
4. Include within the Navy's current PQS program stand-
ards for MS personnel.
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5. Conduct team building workshops for MS work groups
utilizing current assets such as HRMC/D's and FTC's.
6. Conduct some type of assertiveness training for all
MS personnel to facilitate coping with negative feedback.
7. Develop an information package utilizing a multi-
media approach aimed at educating and informing crew members
of the importance and rich history associated with Navy food
service operations.
8. Devise a vehicle to ensure that all MS personnel have
a clear understanding of the background and rationale which
led to the amalgamation of the CS and SD ratings.
9. Include in the MS Rate Training Manuals and "A"
School curriculum a separate section outlining the historical
contributions of food service personnel and the importance of
their role in the modern naval environment.
Recommendation B
To reduce the intercultural friction and improve the
managerial and interpersonal skills of MS personnel, it is
recommended that strong consideration be given to:
1. Encouraging commands to assign priority to MS per-
sonnel when scheduling Leadership and Management Effectiveness
Training (LMET)
.
2. Developing a mini-workshop in interpersonal communi-
cation skills stressing cultural differences between Filipinos
and Caucasian-Americans and emphasizing their antithetical
managerial and leadership styles.
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3. Including didactic instruction in cultural awareness
in the MS "A" and "C" School curricula.
4. Encouraging all MS personnel to utilize education
opportunities, such as the Program for Afloat College Educa-
tion (PACE), to improve their verbal English skills.
Recommendation C
With the advent of amalgamation, the traditional career
guidelines for former CS and SD personnel were disrupted. To
facilitate the transition to new career goals in the MS rating
recommend that
:
1. Career planning workshops be developed for senior
petty officers in the MS rating.
2. A more active, dynamic effort be made to inform junior
MS personnel of career paths to Warrant Officer and educational
opportunities, establish individual career goals for them, and
monitor their progress in reaching these goals.
Recommendation D
To reduce the possibility of cognitive dissonance and unmet
expectations of newly- reported MS "A" School graduates, and to
foster a stronger sense of group identity and belonging, it is
recommended that:
1. A sponsor program be instituted incorporating on board
MS assets. Personal contact should be made prior to an indi-
vidual's departing MS "A" School and close individual support




To make the ninety-day "mess cooking" and rotational pool
assignment periods a more positive experience and encourage
more OJT inputs into the MS rating, recommend that:
1. A suitable reward system recognizing superior per-
formance be instituted. Recognition could take the form of
"Messman of the Month" awards and commanding officer letters
of appreciation (copies to individual, parents/spouse and
service record)
.
2. A training program, focused on professional knowledge,
be developed to ensure rotation through as many food service
skill areas as possible.
3. Mess Deck Masters-at-Arms be made fully aware of the
impact and the critical nature of this ninety-day period in
forming the attitudes and perceptions of young enlisted per-




" At the present time the MS rating is perceived as being
less attractive than many other Navy ratings. This problem
is particularly acute in minority communities, as evidenced
by the small minority input to the rating. To increase the
quality and numbers of personnel seeking entry into the MS
rating, it is recommended that:
1. A more active recruiting effort be made to solicit
qualified enlistees from vocational schools, junior colleges,
technical institutes and high schools who are interested in
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pursuing careers in food service operations, and hotel and
restaurant management.
2. An aggressive campaign be conducted in minority com-
munities to overcome the legacy of history and the apparent
socio-cultural stigma still associated with the former Steward
and Commissaryman ratings. This would have the effect of




Understanding the complexities involved in planning and
instituting change and its impact on structure, goals, people
and technology, is important to the survival of large, modern
organizations. There are currently several change models that
could be utilized in planning for major organizational change.
It is recommended that trained Navy personnel with a back-
ground and experience in Organization Development be included
in the decision making process involving future major
organizational changes.
Recommendation H
It is recommended that an increased number of senior MS
personnel be considered for a tour of duty within the Human
Resource Management field. This could serve to provide an
internal capability to address the socio- technical , cultural





A requirement exists in any planned change effort to
monitor and evaluate the perceptions and attitudes of per-
sonnel affected or involved in the change process. The HRM
survey is an institutionalized diagnostic instrument for
measuring people's attitudes toward and perceptions of the
organization. The standard 88 question survey has a provision
for including 40 additional questions which could be tailored
to measure attitudes and perceptions concerning specific
issues such as organizational change. Therefore, it is rec-
ommended that further research be undertaken to determine the
validity and reliability of using HRM survey data to assess




































































QUESTION MAKEUP OF SURVEY INDICES
HUMAN RESOURCES EMPHASIS INDEX : The command shows concern
for human resources in the way it organizes its personnel to
achieve its mission. Personnel within the command perceive
that the organization and assignment of work sensibly
considers the human element.
Questions
:
1. To what extent does this command have a real interest in
the welfare and morale of assigned personnel?
2. To what extent are work activities sensibly organized in
this command?
3. This command has clear-cut, reasonable goals and objectives
that contribute to its mission.
4. I feel that the workload and time factors are adequately
considered in planning our work group assignments.
5. People at higher levels of the organization are aware of
the problems at your level.
SUPERVISORY SUPPORT INDEX : Leaders behave in a way which
increases the work group members' feelings of worth and dignity,
Questions
:
1. How friendly and easy to approach is your supervisor?
2. When you talk with your supervisor, to what extent does
he/she pay attention to what you are saying?
3. To what extent is your supervisor willing to listen to
your problems?
4. My supervisor makes it easy to tell him/her when things
are not going as well as he/she expects.
PEER SUPPORT INDEX : Work group members behave toward each






1. How friendly and easy to approach are the members of your
work group?
2. When you talk with the members of your work group, to
what extent do they pay attention to what you are saying?
5. To what extent are the members in your work group willing
to listen to your problems?
WORK GROUP COORDINATION INDEX : Work group members plan,
coordinate, and support each other effectively.
Questions
1. To what extent does your work group plan together and
coordinate its efforts?
2. To what extent do you have confidence and trust in the
members of your work group?
3. To what extent is information about important events
widely exchanged within your work group?
4. To what extent does your work group make good decisions
and solve problems well?
SATISFACTION INDEX : Personnel within the command are
satisfied with their supervisors, the command, other work
group members, their jobs, and their present and future
progress in the Navy.
Questions
1. All in all, how satisfied are you with the people in
your work group?
2. All in all, how satisfied are you with your supervisor?
3. All in all, how satisfied are you with your job?
4. All in all, how satisfied are you with this organization,
compared to most others?
5. All in all, how satisfied do you feel with the progress
you have made in the Navy, up to now?
6. How satisfied do you feel with the chance for getting
ahead in the Navy in the future?
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7. Does your assigned work give you pride and feelings of
self worth?









USE A NO 2 BLACn LEAD PENCIL
DO NOT USE INK OR BALLPOINT PENS
MAKE BLACK MARKS BETWEEN DOTTED LINES
ERASE CLEANLY ANY ANSWER YOU WISH TO CHANGE
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The following questions asK lor some background information










-:: Polynesian. Samoan. Hawaiian
"" Chinese. Japanese. Korean
--: White




--.--: Malayan Filipino. Guamanian
-zz BlacK
:; Indian Tribes. Eskimo, Aleut. (Native American)
Mantal status
:::•: Single ( never mamed)
:;•:: Maffied
-::: Other (separated, divorced, widowed)
What IS your highest level of education' (Select one)
:-; : Old not complete high school
::-:: Completed high school (including GEO)
•
;:: Completed some college, or Associate degree
; : Hold 8A;8S or equivalent degree
-
: Hold Masters degree or beyond
How long have you been assigned to this command/organization'
------ Less than 3 mos
--:- 3 mos but less than 6 mos,
:;-.: 6 mos but less than 1 year
::-:: 1 year but less than 2 years
-"" 2 years but less than 4 years
----z 4 years or more
How long have you been assigned to your present workgroup?
"---- Less than 1 month
::-: 1 month but less than 6 mos.
:;::: 6 mos but less than I year
z "-- 1 year or more
Have you taken this Survey before
at this command/organi^alion'
:;::: »es "::: No
(Mil) How many years have you been in the Navy'
(Civ) How many years of federal service have you accumulated'
12 What is your supervisors code?
;*: :*: zz^zz :«:: zzizz r:f:: -*: :#: :;(::
rj:: :*: zz^zz :4*r :*: -^ ::P:: --^- -R::
zzizz ::T:: ":*: ::»:; -m- ::*: ::»:: zzlz
::A:: ::«:: zz&zz tfl:^ ::|r: -*:: ^: •*- ::(::
::J:: zzUzz :4:.- :*; :f(-.: t*r :*-- ^*- :*:
::$.-: ::?:: :*: z\/z: :*; :* ::Y:; zzlz
--^- rj:: z-r-z ::3:: ::4:: ir§:: :*: ::?:: :*- ^-











REMAINING QUESTIONS. FOR MILITARY ONLY
13. What are your current service plans?
"-: Eligible for retirement
--- Plan to remain on duty at least until eligible for retirement
"-: Re-enlisl or extend, but undecided about making Navy a career
"-:
I am undecided about my service plans (not eligible lor retirement)
:;::; Qo not plan to Stay beyond my current obligation. enlistment, or extension
14. How much obligated service do you have left'
"-: Less than 6 mos
:::- 6 mos but less than 1 year
:;r:: 1 year but less than 2 years
::::: 2 years or more (indefinite for officers)
15 Have you completed a formal 2 weeks Leadership and Management Course
for Officers/Petty Officers (LMT) since 1974'
:::--r (es ::::: No
(Question 16 is for ENLISTED ONLY All officers skip to i»17
16 What IS your rating or striker designation' (Ex, AT.ETR.YN)
If non-designated give apprenticeship group (Ex: FA SN.HN)
If It has only two letters use upper two boxes.
--A-- *^ ^^=-- zzS--- -r zzfzz ^ *: ::(::
..t-z :*:
-t-- :*: :*; :«:: "?:: ^- ::R::
-:V-- ::!- -z^-- r:»-.r --*- :*: ::V:: ::Z::
:*: :*: ^=6--: -*- ::J:: :if:: =*- -^-- ::(::
;:J:: :*= -t-- -«:: :*: :*: ::^: -^- z-St
:*: .:T:: ==^-- .-:»:: :*- :*: ::»::
-Pf- --*-- -t-- :e=: r:|:: ::f:: -^= :*:
::):: :-*: :rt:: :»-- :*: --^-- ..fzz ^ :»
:*= ::T:: --# zz)t.z zittz -it- "Y-: I-
Question 17 is for OFFICERS and WARRANT OFFICERS only,


























ommand?1. What's it like to be an MS at this c
2. If you were in the Navy prior to the merger of the CS and
SD ratings (Jan 75):
a. Were you a CS or SD and where were you stationed
(geographically)
?
b. What was the most difficult part for you in making
the transition?
c. What was done by your command to make the transition
easier?
d. What else could have been done to make the transition
easier?
3. What do you think could be done to give you a greater sense
of pride in your rating? (i.e., what isn't being done that
pisses you off?)
4. Please indicate your present intention concerning reenlist-
ment on the following five point scale: (Retirement= 6)
Definitely No Probably No Undecided Probably Yes Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5
**If respondent answer = 1 , 2 or 3, include "probe" of question 5.
i
5. What are the primary reasons you see for young men/women
(E3,4,5) leaving the MS rating?
**Probe: Would elimination of any of these reasons make you
g
want to reenlist?
6. In the MS rating, are majority and minority people suspicious
of each other? (If yes, go to "probe")
ll










UNCLAS //^0122</i/ / ,
SUBJECT: UTILIZATION OF MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (MS)
PERSONNEL
1. THIS NAVOP ANNOUNCES THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF TWO OF THE
NAVY'S OLDEST AND PROUDEST RATINGS. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
HAS APPROVED THE MERGER OF THE COMMISSARYMAN AND STEWARD
R^^TINGS INTO A NEW MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (MS) RATING WITH
AN EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1 JANUARY 1975. THIS NAVOP ALSO PROVIDES
GENERAL GUIDANCE REGARDING THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WILL GUIDE THE
RATING MERGER AND THE UTILIZATION OF MS PERSONNEL. SPECIFIC
IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE WILL BE ISSUED FOR EACH AREA REQUIRING
POLICY DIRECTIVES.
2. THE MS RATING IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A SINGLE SOURCE
RATING FOR PERSONNEL TRAINED TO PERFORM FOOD PREPARATION, FOOD
SERVICE AND HOTEL MANAGEMENT DUTIES THROUGHOUT THE NAVY.
ALTHOUGH ENLISTED FOOD PREPARATION AND SERVICE WILL NOT BE
AFFECTED BY THE MERGER, MANY OF THE DUTIES FORMERLY PERFORMED
BY PERSONNEL OF THE SD RATING ARE NOT INCLUDED WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE MS RATING AND HAVE EITHER BEEN
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ELIMINATED, DESIGNATED AS AN OFFICER'S INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
OR WILL BE ASSUMED BY ROTATIONAL POOLS OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL,
E-1 THROUGH E-3, UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF MS PETTY OFFICERS.
3. AS REGARDS ROTATIONAL POOLS, OPNAV WILL AUTOMATICALLY
CONVERT SELECTED BILLETS FROM SD APPRENTICE TO GENERAL
APPRENTICESHIP BILLETS FOR USE IN ROTATIONAL POOLS AFLOAT AND
WILL IDENTIFY SD APPRENTICE BILLETS FOR CIVILIANIZATION ASHORE.
THIS EFFORT WILL COMMENCE IN JULY, 1975, AND BILLET CONVERSION
WILL BE COMPLETED AFLOAT BY DECEMBER, 1975. COMMANDING OFFI-
CERS WILL ESTABLISH ROTATIONAL POOLS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BILLET
CONVERSION AS ADDITIONAL E-l'S THROUGH E-3'S BECOME AVAILABLE
FOR PERFORIvIAiNCE OF HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS IN OFFICER LIVING
SPACES AFLOAT. SUCH FUNCTIONS WILL ULTIMATELY BE CIVILIANIZED
ASHORE TO THE MAXIMUM ^EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHIN FUNDING AUTHORI-
ZATIONS. ALL PERSONNEL E-1 THROUGH E-3 WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR
ASSIGNMENT TO ROTATIONAL POOLS WITHOUT EXCEPTION AND WILL
NORMALLY REMAIN IN THE POOL FOR A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. PETTY
OFFICERS AND MARINE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS SHALL NOT BE
DETAILED TO ROTATIONAL POOLS EXCEPT WHEN E-3 AND BELOW
PERSONNEL ARE NOT AVAILABLE.
4. PERSONNEL OF THE MS RATING WILL ESSENTIALLY PERFORM THE
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A. BASIC OFFICER STATEROOM OR LIVING SPACE MAINTENANCE SERVICE
INCLUDING SWEEPING, DUSTING, SINK CLEANING AND PAINTING AS
REQUIRED WILL BE PROVIDED TO ALL OFFICERS AFLOAT AND ASHORE.
HOWEVER, THESE HOUSEKEEPING DUTIES WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF A ROTATIONAL POOL AFLOAT AND WILL BE CIVILIANIZED TO THE
MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE ASHORE. BED MAKING SERVICE WILL BE
PROVIDED ONLY TO GO'S, XO'S, UNIT COMMANDERS AND OFFICERS IN
THE GRADES OF 0-5 AND ABOVE OR THEIR EQUIVALENTS.
B. MAINTENANCE AND CLEANING OF PASSAGEWAYS AND HEADS IN
OFFICER'S COUNTRY IS ALSO A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ROTATIONAL
POOL.
C. ALL OFFICERS ARE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE, MAIN-
TENANCE AND ORDERLINESS OF THEIR OWN PERSONAL EFFECTS.
SORTING AND STOWAGE OF PERSONAL LAUNDRY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER. THE ROTATIONAL POOL MAY BE
REQUIRED TO PICK UP AND DELIVER OFFICER LAUNDRY.
D. CLEANING AND MAINTENANCE OF OFFICER FOOD SERVICE AND
RELATED SPACES INCLUDING FOOD SERVICE AREAS, FOOD PREPARATION
AREAS AND SCULLERIES WILL NORMALLY BE CONSIDERED A RESPONSI-
BILITY OF THE MS RATING. HOWEVER, IN THOSE CASES WHERE
ASSIGNMENT TO OFFICER FOOD
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SERVICE SPACE CLEANING OR SCULLERY DUTIES IS NECESSARY ON A
FULL TIME BASIS, SUCH DUTIES SHOULD BE SHIFTED TO THE ROTA-
TIONAL POOL WHERE PRACTICABLE OR CIVILIANIZED ASHORE.
E. FAMILY OR BUFFET STYLE FOOD SERVICE WILL BE USED IN
OFFICER MESSES WHERE FEASIBLE. INDIVIDUAL SERVICE IS STILL
AUTHORIZED AT BREAKFAST OR FOR SPECIAL OCCASIONS. FOOD
SERVICE IN CO, UNIT COMMANDER AND FLAG MESSES WILL REMAIN
UNCHANGED.
5. ALTHOUGH ALL FORMER CS AND SD PERSONNEL WILL BE CONVERTED
TO THE NEW MS RATING, MS PERSONNEL AND BILLETS WILL BE
ASSIGNED SPECIAL NECS TO IDENTIFY FORMER SOURCE RATINGS.
THESE NECS WILL BE USED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES DURING
THE CONVERSION PERIOD AND WILL BE PHASED OUT AS PERSONNEL
ARE ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND STUDY MANUALS AND EXAMS BECOME
AVAILABLE UNDER THE MS RATING CONCEPT. COMMANDING OFFICERS
WILL ENSURE THAT MS PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED IN A MANNER TO
BE CROSS TRAINED IN BOTH OFFICER AND ENLISTED FOOD SERVICE
MAI>IAGEMENT.
6. FORMER STEWARDS AND COMMISSARYMEN WILL RETAIN THEIR OLD
RATING BADGES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNTIL NEW RATING
BADGES BECOME AVAILABLE.
7. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE






MS AND NAVY NORMATIVE DATA
1974 1975 1976 r (correlation
coefficient)
MS X 2.96 2.83 2.97











MS X 3.50 3.43 3.50
N 1111 3212 2225
SS
-.68
Navy X 3.51 3.63 3.10
MS X 3.46 3.45 3.46
N 1105 3201 2213
PS
-.50
Navy X 3.58 3.66 3.66
MS X 3.23 3.13 3.19
N 1111 3204 2209
WGC -.50
Navy X 3.14 3.27 2.94
MS X 3.23 3.32 3.44
N 1107 3207 2219
SAT .92
Navy X 3.13 3.27 3.31
\_l N for Navy normative data is the same for

























































Caucasians (N = 26)
Command
:
f~^ f^CG 5 Sex: Male= 23; Female=3
FF 4
LST 1 TIS: (years ) #
BOQ 7 1 5
NTC 4 2 6
SUB 2 3 3
EDF (shore) 2 4 2










MS 2 3 13 1
MSI 2 14 2
MSC 1 15-1617 1
Age: 18-20 5
18 5 above











FF 3 TIS: (years) #
LST 4 10 6




Paygrade MS 3 2 1415
1
2
MS 2 9 16 3






























10 or more 1





RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Table I - Caucasian vs. Filipino
INDEX 1/74 - 12/74 7/76 - 12/76
Human Resource Emphasis F(559,392)=1.12 F(504,471)=1.10
Supervisory Support F(560,393)=1.35** F(505,474)=1.26**
Peer Support F(391,557)=1.06 F(504,471)=1.19*
Work Group Coord. F(393,560)=1.06 F(504,469)=1.21*
Satis faction F(395,555)=1.03 F(506,473)=1.41**
* p £ .05
** p < .01
Table II - Within Racial Group; 1974 vs. 1976 (second half)
INDEX CAUCASIAN FILIPINO
Human Resource Emphasis F(504,392)=l.ll FC559,471)=1.37**
Supervisory Support F(505,393)=1.13 F(560,474)=1.22*
Peer Support F(504, 3913=1.01 F(557,471)=1.10
Work Group Coord. F(504,393)=1.14 F(560,469)=1.00
Satisfaction F(506,395)=1.05 F(555,473)=1.46**
=^ p £ .05
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